A Race To The Courthouse? Jurisdiction Over Customs Admissibility Decisions*

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I. Introduction

U.S. Customs & Border Protection ("CBP") is the principal federal agency charged with determining the admissibility of merchandise offered for importation into the United States of America. Customs officers may admit merchandise, exclude merchandise from entry (or demand return of merchandise to customs custody), or seize merchandise for violation of law, depending upon the controlling statutes and regulations. Persons adversely affected by CBP’s exclusion or seizure of merchandise – or CBP’s failure to exclude or seize merchandise – may desire judicial review of the agency’s actions. Several recent decisions of the Court of International Trade ("CIT") and the federal district courts highlight the jurisdictional issues litigants face when challenging CBP decisions and selecting the appropriate forum to obtain judicial relief.² This article reviews these recent decisions in the context of the historical development of case law construing the competing jurisdictional grants of the district courts and CIT as they relate to CBP decisions concerning admissibility, exclusions and seizures. This article suggests that seizure of goods should not automatically preclude CIT jurisdiction to review CBP’s underlying admissibility decision in appropriate cases.

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II. **CBP Authority To Detain, Exclude or Seize Imported Merchandise**

CBP’s authority to examine, detain, exclude and/or seize imported merchandise is derived from a myriad of statutes and corresponding regulations. Consequently, the determination of which court possesses jurisdiction to review CBP action can often depend upon the statutory and/or regulatory authority under which CBP has acted, and whether CBP’s actions resulted in an “exclusion” of the goods from entry as opposed to a “seizure” of the goods.

CBP authority to exclude imported merchandise from entry is derived primarily from 19 U.S.C. § 1499(a). This section provides generally that imported merchandise “shall not be delivered from customs custody (except under such bond or other security as may be prescribed by the Secretary to assure compliance with all applicable laws . . . which . . . the Customs Service is authorized to enforce) until the merchandise has been . . . found to comply with the requirements of the laws of the United States.”3 Inherent in the statutory language is CBP’s authority to withhold delivery of, *i.e.*, “detain,” merchandise until CBP has determined that the merchandise is in compliance with applicable laws; and to deny admission of merchandise found not to be in compliance with applicable laws.

Statutes establishing admissibility requirements on imported merchandise are too numerous to list. Review of several of the most commonly enforced statutes and implementing regulations indicates that CBP often has discretion to deny admission of non-compliant goods

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3 19 U.S.C. § 1499(a) (2006). *See also* 19 C.F.R. § 151.1 (2012) (“The port director shall examine such packages or quantities of merchandise as he deems necessary for the determination of duties and for compliance with the Customs laws and any other laws enforced by the Customs Service.”); 19 C.F.R. §141.113 (2012) (mandating the port director shall demand return to CBP custody of merchandise found not entitled to admission into the commerce of the United States).
rather than seize the merchandise.\textsuperscript{4} Customs regulations governing the importation and admissibility of many, but not all, types of merchandise subject to restrictions or prohibitions are set forth in 19 C.F.R. Part 12.\textsuperscript{5} With respect to admissibility decisions under these or similar statutes and regulations, CBP can make a decision to exclude merchandise, whether or not CBP may subsequently decide to seize the merchandise. Some statutes and their corresponding regulations would appear to mandate seizure.\textsuperscript{6} Other statutes, such as 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d), expressly provide only for an exclusion from entry.\textsuperscript{7}

III. Jurisdictional Framework

There is a strong presumption favoring judicial review of agency decisions.\textsuperscript{8} When a party aggrieved by an agency decision involving admissibility seeks judicial review, the

\textsuperscript{4} See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (2006) (“no article of imported merchandise which shall copy or simulate a trademark registered in accordance with the provisions of the Act . . . shall be admitted to entry at any customhouse of the United States”); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2006) (stating that goods marked or labeled in contravention of § 1125(a) “shall not be . . . admitted to entry at any customhouse . . . [and] the owner, importer or consignee of goods refused entry . . . may have any recourse by protest or appeal that is given under the customs revenue laws”); 19 U.S.C. §1526(b) (2006) (stating that merchandise bearing a registered trademark imported without the consent of the owner of such trade-mark “shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture”); 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(2) (2006) (“merchandise may be seized and forfeited if . . . its importation or entry is subject to any restriction or prohibition which is imposed by law related to health, safety or conservation and the merchandise is not in compliance with the applicable rule, regulation or statute.”); 19 C.F.R. § 133.22(b) (2012) (stating that imported articles bearing a copying or simulating mark shall be denied entry and detained).

\textsuperscript{5} See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 12.74 (2012) (setting forth procedures for admissibility determinations, detentions and exclusion from entry for non-road engines not meeting certain requirements of the Environmental Protection Agency).

\textsuperscript{6} See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) (2006) (stating that merchandise bearing a counterfeit mark imported into the United States “shall be seized and, in the absence of written consent of the trademark owner, forfeited for violations of the customs laws.”); 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(1) (2006) (“The merchandise shall be seized and forfeited if it . . . is stolen, smuggled or clandestinely imported or introduced.”).


\textsuperscript{8} Reilly v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 571 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
The federal district courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, as well as any civil action arising under federal patent, trademark and copyright laws. With respect to customs seizures, two statutes confer jurisdiction on the federal district courts. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1355, the district courts “have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of any action or proceeding for the recovery or enforcement of any fine, penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, incurred under an Act of Congress, except matters within the jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade under section 1582 [of Title 28].” Under 28 U.S.C. § 1356, the district courts “have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the States, of any seizure under any law of the United States upon land or upon waters not within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, except matters with the jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade under section 1582.”

The CIT’s jurisdiction is provided in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1584. Civil actions against the United States are delineated in § 1581. Three subsections thereof are relevant to admissibility decisions. Under subsection (a), the CIT has exclusive jurisdiction to contest the denial of a

14 Civil actions commenced by the United States are provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1582. Such actions are limited to recovery of civil penalties under specified statutes, the recovery on a customs bond, and recovery of customs duties. 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (2006).
protest under 19 U.S.C. § 1515. A protest is an administrative procedure authorized in 19 U.S.C. § 1514 that enables an importer to obtain agency review of specified CBP decisions. A CBP decision to exclude merchandise or demand its redelivery may be contested before the agency in accordance with § 1514(a)(4). If CBP denies the protest, an importer may commence a civil action under § 1581 to contest denial of the protest. Thus, a CBP decision resulting in exclusion of merchandise is reviewable in the CIT pursuant to § 1514(a)(4) and § 1581(a).

The jurisdictional provisions of § 1514(a) and § 1581(a) are augmented by the statutory detention procedures set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1499(c). These procedures provide for a deemed “exclusion” of merchandise in the event CBP fails to make an admissibility determination within thirty days of the goods being presented for examination. The deemed exclusion can then be subject to protest under § 1514(a)(4). Unless acted upon sooner, a protest against a decision to exclude merchandise shall be treated as denied within thirty days after it was filed for purposes of jurisdiction under § 1581. Section 1499(c) also provides that detained merchandise may be seized if otherwise provided by law.

There are two other jurisdictional provisions of § 1581 that relate to CBP decisions regarding admissibility. Section 1581(h) grants the CIT exclusive jurisdiction to review, prior to importation, a CBP ruling or a refusal to issue a ruling, relating to, inter alia, “restricted merchandise, entry requirements, . . . or similar matters, but only if the party commencing the civil action demonstrates to the court that he would be irreparably harmed unless given an

16 Section 1514(a)(4) provides in relevant part that all decisions of CBP, “including the legality of all orders and findings entering into the same, as to . . . the exclusion of merchandise from entry or delivery or a demand for redelivery to customs custody under any provision of the customs laws . . . shall be final . . . unless a protest is filed in accordance with § 1514, or unless a civil action contesting the denial of a protest . . . is commenced in the Court of International Trade.  19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(4) (2006).
opportunity to obtain judicial review prior to such importation.”19 “Restricted merchandise” is merchandise with specific admissibility requirements that might be subject to exclusion from entry.

Lastly, the CIT also has so-called “residual” jurisdiction over civil actions commenced against the United States, its agencies or officers, that arise out of any law of the United States providing for:

(1) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of merchandise for reasons other than the raising of revenue;
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of merchandise for reasons other than the protection of the public health or safety; or
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the matters referred to in paragraphs (1)–(3) of this subsection and subsections (a)–(h) of this section.20

It is well-settled that jurisdiction under § 1581(i) may only be invoked if jurisdiction is not available under §§ 1581(a)-(h).21 A CBP decision to exclude merchandise would normally be reviewable under § 1581(a) following denial of a protest under § 1514(a)(4). Section 1581(i) might provide judicial review of other CBP decisions concerning admissibility, provided those decisions arose out of a law providing for “embargoes or other quantitative restrictions” or laws providing for administration and enforcement of embargoes or quantitative restrictions.22

Much of the litigation concerning jurisdiction to review CBP decisions relating to admissibility of merchandise has centered upon several issues: (1) is there a CBP decision

21 See Int’l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States, 467 F.3d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating that jurisdiction under § 1581 (i) may not be invoked if jurisdiction is also available under § 1581 (a)); Miller & Co. v. United States, 824 F.2d 961, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“Section 1581(i) jurisdiction may not be invoked when jurisdiction under another subsection of § 1581 is or could have been available, unless the remedy provided under that other subsection would be manifestly inadequate.”).
resulting in an “exclusion” that could be subject to a protest, (2) is there a “seizure” of
merchandise for which jurisdiction might lie in a district court, and (3) is the CBP decision to
exclude, or not to exclude, the merchandise arising out of a law providing for embargoes or other
quantitative restrictions. The tension is primarily between the CIT’s exclusive jurisdiction to
review protests against exclusion of merchandise under § 1581(a) and the federal district court’s
jurisdiction over seizures under § 1356.

IV. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) Cases -- Exclusions Versus Seizures

A long line of CIT cases have evaluated the breadth of the court’s jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1581(a) regarding CBP admissibility decisions. Two trends can be distilled from these
cases. First, there seems to be a consensus that the CIT can only have jurisdiction under §
1581(a) if there has been an “exclusion” of the goods or demand for redelivery, which come
within the protestable decisions delineated in 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a). Second, there seems to be
some divergence as to whether the CIT can assert or retain jurisdiction where a protestable
exclusion is followed by a seizure of the goods. Some decisions have found jurisdiction to
review a denied protest notwithstanding subsequent seizure of the goods, whereas other
decisions have found jurisdiction in the CIT lacking. The recent decisions in PRP Trading Corp. v. United States and CBB Group, Inc. v. United States illustrate this divergence.

A. Defining an Exclusion

23 For example, in Lois Jeans & Jackets, U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 5 Ct. Int'l Trade 238 (1983), the CIT had
jurisdiction under § 1581(a) where plaintiff had protested a demand to redeliver goods to Customs custody. The
underlying admissibility decision was based on alleged trademark infringement. See id. at 239.
CIT lacked jurisdiction over deemed exclusion where CBP seized the goods);
25 CBB Group, Inc. v. United States, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2011) (holding that CIT could exercise
jurisdiction over deemed exclusion even though CBP seized the goods).
An “exclusion” of merchandise must take place in order for protest jurisdiction to lie under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). The CIT has generally applied the following distinction between protestable exclusions and non-protestable seizures:

Exclusion differs from seizure in that the effect of an exclusion is to deny entry into the customs territory of the United States. The importer may then dispose of the goods as he chooses. In the case of seizure, however, the government often takes control of the merchandise, and may ultimately institute forfeiture proceedings.

In RJF Fabrics, the court found that “[e]ntry of the shipment of plaintiff’s textiles was denied by Customs” approximately five weeks prior to seizure. The court found that denial of entry was a protestable exclusion, even though Customs had clearly taken control of the goods.

In Int’l Maven, Customs seized the goods and issued a seizure notice four days after entry. The court found that Customs had never excluded the goods prior to seizure, and thus found no protestable exclusion within the jurisdiction of the CIT. The Int’l Maven court cited four factors in concluding that plaintiff had not protested an exclusion: (1) the protest itself challenged a seizure; (2) the plaintiff received a notice of seizure; (3) the government had control over the merchandise; and (4) upon notice, the plaintiff was required to choose between immediate forfeiture proceedings or a petition relief.

27 R.J.F. Fabrics Inc. v. United States, 10 Ct. Int’l Trade 735 (1986); See also H & H Wholesale, 21 Ct. Int’l Trade at 692.
28 RJF Fabrics, 10 Ct. Int’l Trade at 737.
29 Id. at 740.
31 Id. at 58.
32 Id.
H & H Wholesale applied the four factors of Int’l Maven in reaching a decision that plaintiff had not established a protestable exclusion.\(^{33}\) H & H Wholesale provides a thorough analysis of the court’s jurisdictional basis to review exclusions under § 1581(a). In H & H Wholesale, goods were held for customs exam within days of entry, and were subsequently seized by CBP less than thirty days later.\(^{34}\) Seizure was based on alleged trademark violations.\(^{35}\) The court first considered whether there was a “deemed exclusion” under 19 U.S.C. § 1499(c). Under § 1499(c), goods are deemed excluded from entry if CBP fails to make a determination of admissibility within thirty days of the goods being presented for examination.\(^{36}\) As the goods had been seized less than thirty days after examination, the court found there was no deemed exclusion of the goods.\(^{37}\) The court then considered whether there was an express exclusion of the goods.\(^{38}\) The court applied the four factor test of Int’l Maven to conclude there was no exclusion of the goods.\(^{39}\)

Lastly, H & H Wholesale considered plaintiff’s argument that alleged failure of CBP to provide plaintiff a notice of detention, as required under § 1499(c)(2), could provide a basis for residual jurisdiction under § 1581(i)(4).\(^{40}\) The court noted that § 1581(i)(4) only extends residual jurisdiction to administration and enforcement of matters identified in § 1581 (e.g., a protest


\(^{34}\) Id. at 689-90.

\(^{35}\) Id. at 690.

\(^{36}\) 19 U.S.C. § 1499(c)(5)(A) (2006) (mandating that CBP failure to make an admissibility determination within thirty days “shall be treated as a decision of the Customs Service to exclude the merchandise for purposes of section 514(a)(4)”).

\(^{37}\) H & H Wholesale, 30 Ct. Int’l Trade at 693.

\(^{38}\) Id. (“Absent a deemed exclusion, [the plaintiff] must show that an express exclusion of the merchandise occurred.”).

\(^{39}\) Id. at 694. See also CDCOM (U.S.A.) Int’l v. United States, 21 Ct. Int’l Trade 435 (1997) (holding that there was no deemed exclusion where goods were seized within thirty days of examination, and there was no actual exclusion under the Int’l Maven factors).

\(^{40}\) H & H Wholesale, 30 Ct. Int’l Trade at 700.
denied under 19 U.S.C. § 1515), and that failure to provide notice of detention under § 1499(c) did not relate to the denial of protest of an exclusion.41

B. Does Seizure Preclude CIT Jurisdiction of an Exclusion Protest?

When there is no express or deemed exclusion preceding a seizure, the court’s jurisdictional analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) is simple. However, where there is a deemed or express exclusion followed by a seizure, the question arises as to whether 28 U.S.C. § 1356 prevents the CIT from entertaining jurisdiction over a denied protest of such exclusion. In RJF Fabrics and later in Milin Industries v. United States42, the court found that Customs had excluded the merchandise prior to seizure. In both cases the goods were eventually seized for alleged violations of textile quotas, and in both cases plaintiffs filed protests against the exclusion of the goods subsequent to the intervening seizure notices. In both cases the government argued that the district courts had jurisdiction over the seizures under § 1356 and that, therefore, the CIT actions must be dismissed.

The court rejected the government’s position and retained jurisdiction in both cases. In RJF Fabrics, the court stated:

There is no doubt that plaintiff could have protested Customs’ action after the denial of entry on July 2 and July 11. The Court is unwilling, therefore, to adopt a rule that would divest the Court of International Trade of jurisdiction simply because plaintiff filed its protest after Customs chose, on August 15, to formally seize the subject goods. Plaintiff in the instant case has pursued the appropriate

41 Id. at 701. The effect of failure to provide a notice of detention required by §1499(c)(2) could be addressed in a forfeiture proceeding in district court. See United States v. Thirty-Six (36) 300 cc On Road Scooters Model, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139509 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (finding CBP’s failure to provide notice of detention did not void subsequent seizure).
administrative procedure and properly seeks a declaratory judgment\textsuperscript{43} concerning country of origin of its merchandise excluded from entry by Customs.\textsuperscript{44}

Perhaps importantly, the court noted that the underlying admissibility determination involved the country of origin of merchandise excluded for possible violations of quota requirements, which was the type of matter that should be decided in the CIT.\textsuperscript{45} The court went on to state, “[t]here is no reason that plaintiff’s action must be dismissed simply because civil forfeiture or criminal proceedings may at some unspecified point be brought in the district court.”\textsuperscript{46}

In \textit{Milin}, the court followed \textit{RFJ Fabrics} and declined to dismiss the action. The \textit{Milin} court relied heavily on the fact that the underlying admissibility determination depended upon the tariff classification of the seized merchandise under the Tariff Schedules of the United States, in contrast to a seizure based on trademark violations as in \textit{Int’l Maven}.\textsuperscript{47}

In \textit{Tempco Marketing v. United States}\textsuperscript{48}, and \textit{Genii Trading Company v. United States}\textsuperscript{49}, two cases decided on the same day by the same judge, the court found it lacked jurisdiction notwithstanding the deemed exclusion of the merchandise and the filing of protests challenging the deemed exclusions. In both cases, goods were detained for possible trademark violations, and were deemed excluded thirty days afterwards. Subsequent to the deemed exclusions, but prior to filing a protest, plaintiffs received notices of seizure. In both cases the court distinguished \textit{RFJ Fabrics} and \textit{Milin} based on the fact that the underlying admissibility decision

\textsuperscript{43} In actions brought under § 1581, the Court of International Trade may, in addition to a money judgment, order any other form of relief that is appropriate, including declaratory judgments, injunctions, and writs of mandamus and prohibition. 28 U.S.C. § 2643(c)(1).


\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Id.} at 741.

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Milin}, 12 Ct. Int’l Trade at 663.


involved substantive trademark law, not the customs laws.50 It is against this background that the court decided the more recent cases of PRP Trading and CBB Group.

CBB Group concerned goods detained as possible piratical copies of a registered copyright.51 The goods were imported in early September 2010, and CBP did not make an admissibility determination within thirty days of examination.52 As a consequence, the court found that the goods were deemed excluded on the thirtieth day, in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1499(c)(5).53 Plaintiff filed a protest, which was deemed denied thirty days later.54 On the following day, December 21, plaintiff filed a summons in the CIT.55 On January 11, 2011, CBP sent plaintiff a notice of seizure stating the goods had been seized on December 21 as being clearly piratical.56

The government moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief. Although defendant agreed that the court had jurisdiction to review the deemed exclusion of plaintiff’s goods,57 defendant asserted that once CBP seized the goods, only the district court had

50 Tempco, 21 Ct. Int’l Trade at 193-94 (1997) (“There is one final consideration tipping the scales in favor of finding no jurisdiction. The underlying substantive issue is one involving trademark law.”); Gennii Trading, 21 Ct. Int’l Trade at 197 (“There is one final consideration tipping the scales in favor of finding no jurisdiction. The underlying substantive issue in this case is one involving trademark law.”). In Luxury Int’l Inc. v. United States, 23 Ct. Int’l Trade 694 (1999), the court had jurisdiction to review an exclusion protest relating to goods detained for suspected copyright infringement. Although the admissibility determination was based on substantive copyright law, CBP had not seized the goods pending completion of an administrative determination under 19 C.F.R. § 133.44. The crux of plaintiff’s protest was that CBP should release the goods for technical non-compliance with the regulations. Because there had not yet been a seizure, the issue of district court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1356 did not arise. The goods were ultimately found subject to seizure and forfeiture after CBP completed a copyright infringement determination in accordance with 19 C.F.R. § 133.44. See Luxury Int’l, 23 Ct. Int’l Trade at 698.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 1251.
55 Id. at 1249.
56 Id. at 1250.
57 Id. at 1251.
jurisdiction to review a seizure under § 1356. The government argued, therefore, that the CIT could not grant any relief in plaintiff’s action to contest the deemed exclusion of the goods.58

The court found it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) because plaintiff had protested a deemed exclusion. The court framed the issue as follows: did CBP’s issuance of a seizure notice more than sixty days after examination of the goods, and after the CIT action had been commenced, preclude the court from retaining jurisdiction and granting plaintiff any relief?59 Relying in part on 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a),60 the court concluded that once jurisdiction attached, the court, and not the agency, had the authority to make the final determination of admissibility.61 The court also examined § 1499(c) and its legislative history and found no indication that Congress intended to preclude the court from granting relief once an action had been commenced in the CIT.62 In particular the court focused on a statement from the legislative history to § 1499(c) stating that “the burden of proof shall be on the Customs Service to show . . . good cause as to why an admissibility decision had not been made prior to the time the importer commenced suit.”63 The court further noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1356 is strictly a jurisdictional provision and does not address the relief available in an action brought in the CIT.64 Finally, the court distinguished Tempco Mktg. and Genii Trading on the grounds that in those cases CIT jurisdiction had not attached prior to the agency issuance of a seizure notice.65

The decision in CBB Group is consistent with prior CIT decisions. In both RJF Fabrics and Milin, Customs had issued seizure notices after exclusions but prior to plaintiffs’ protests. In both cases, the court found it properly had jurisdiction over the exclusions notwithstanding 28

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58 Id. at 1249.
59 Id. at 1253.
60 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a), the court is to make its determinations based on the record developed before the court.
61 CBB Group, 783 F. Supp. at 1254.
62 Id.
63 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 103-361, at 112 (1993)).
64 Id. at 1255.
65 Id. at 1256.
U.S.C. § 1356 and Customs intervening seizure notices. Stated otherwise, the court rejected the notion that the seizures trumped the exclusion protests.

Though not expressly stated therein, these cases clearly recognize the very simple proposition that behind nearly every Customs seizure of merchandise is an admissibility determination made by Customs. To be sure, a forfeiture proceeding in district court can involve legal issues beyond the threshold admissibility determination made by Customs. However, if a plaintiff can properly bring that admissibility determination before the CIT, then the CIT should be empowered to decide that admissibility issue notwithstanding the potential that a forfeiture proceeding might be initiated in a federal district court, or even is pending.

The notion that the CIT is powerless to grant meaningful relief to the plaintiff simply because CBP issued a seizure notice would seem incorrect.

RFJ Fabrics illustrates this point. As the court noted therein, “[p]laintiff . . . has pursued the appropriate administrative procedure and properly seeks a declaratory judgment concerning the country of origin of its merchandise excluded from entry by Customs.” A declaratory judgment that goods are admissible can provide meaningful relief, even if not accompanied by a

66 In this author’s experience, Customs seizures of merchandise are effected primarily under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c) and § 1526(e). Under both statutes, the grounds for seizure all involve findings that the merchandise is not admissible. See also 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(4) (stating that goods imported in violation of laws governing classification or value cannot be seized if there is no issue of admissibility, except in limited situations authorized under 19 U.S.C. § 1592); CDCOM (U.S.A.) Int’l v. United States, 21 Ct. Int'l Trade 435, 438-39 (1997) (“Customs made an admissibility determination within the thirty-day statutory period . . . declaring both shipments of the subject merchandise ‘seized’”).

67 See, e.g. United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999) (addressing claimant’s contention that seizure of merchandise violated the Fifth and Eighth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution).

68 See Fuji Photo Film v. Benun, 463 F.3d 1252, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[W]hile Ribi Tech has expressed frustration at the possibility that it will have to confront similar issues in both the Court of International Trade and the district court, . . . such duplication of litigation efforts is simply not relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry.”) Additional support can be derived from Shah Bros. v. United States, 751 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2010), wherein the court stated, “any actual Customs ‘decision’ underlying such seizure, forfeiture, or criminal prosecution is protestable. The fact that Customs seizes and forfeits the classified imports neither deprives a plaintiff of the protest procedure under 19 U.S.C. §1514(a)(2) nor divests this Court of jurisdiction over the protest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a).” Id. at 1314-15. While Shah Bros may be distinguishable on several grounds, it does lend support to the notion that, in appropriate cases, the CIT can review a denied protest notwithstanding a pending seizure case.

A direct order to CBP to release the goods.\(^{70}\) A CIT decision might be given preclusive effect on the issue of admissibility in a subsequent forfeiture proceeding, and thereby effectively resolve the forfeiture litigation.\(^{71}\) A CIT admissibility decision might, as a practical matter, also resolve the admissibility of prospective importations. When evaluated in this light, a CIT decision rendered while goods are sitting in a CBP seizure warehouse is not materially different than a CIT decision rendered in a case brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h) by an importer that is contesting a CBP advanced ruling that goods are inadmissible.\(^{72}\) The only real difference is that in the latter, the goods are held in a warehouse overseas, whereas in the former they are held in a Customs seizure warehouse.

Several decisions have suggested that the amendments made by the Customs Modernization Act\(^{73}\) ("Mod Act") to 19 U.S.C. § 1499(c) and its legislative history, in particular § 1499(c)(4), preclude the CIT from asserting jurisdiction over an exclusion protest when CBP has issued an intervening seizure notice. Section 1499(c)(4) states that “[i]f otherwise provided by law, detained merchandise may be seized and forfeited.”\(^{74}\) Citing this provision, the court in \textit{CDCOM} stated, “[c]ongress has also expressly provided that merchandise may be detained and then seized without having gone through a period of exclusion.”\(^{75}\) While this is true, it is not clear that § 1499(c)(4) does anything more than recognize that Customs retains the authority to seize goods during the detention phase. Under the statutory framework, exclusion is deemed to

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\(^{70}\) A direct order to CBP to release goods would probably be unnecessary as continued custody of plaintiff’s merchandise may contravene the Fifth Amendment absent independent grounds for seizure.


\(^{73}\) Title VI of the NAFTA Implementation Act, Pub.L 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057.


occur if CBP does not release or seize the goods within the initial thirty day detention period.\textsuperscript{76} Nothing in § 1499(c)(4) states that seizure \textit{after} an exclusion precludes judicial review in the CIT of the \textit{precedent} exclusion.

The legislative history indicates that the purpose of the Mod Act amendments was not to prevent importers from utilizing existing paths to judicial review, but rather to “provide the importer with notice of the detention decision and a remedy if the detention extends beyond 60 days.”\textsuperscript{77} The legislative history states further, “[s]ection 613 will bring the law into conformity with existing practice regarding the examination and detention of merchandise.”\textsuperscript{78} Existing practice at the time of enactment was represented by decisions such as \textit{RJF Fabrics}, \textit{Milin} and \textit{Int'l Maven}. \textit{RJF Fabrics} and \textit{Milin} clearly rejected the proposition that a post-exclusion seizure trumps CIT jurisdiction in favor of the district courts.\textsuperscript{79} There is not a single statement in the legislative history that Congress intended to overrule \textit{RJF Fabrics} and \textit{Milin} and preclude CIT jurisdiction over an exclusion protest properly brought before the court.

The CIT’s jurisdiction over exclusion protests connected to seizures was evaluated once again in the very recent decision \textit{PRP Trading Corp}. Unlike \textit{Int'l Maven}, \textit{CDCOM}, \textit{H & H Wholesale} and others, this case did not involve alleged infringement of trademarks or copyrights. Rather, this case involved alleged false country of origin marking on aluminum extrusions.\textsuperscript{80} Two of the entries were seized more than thirty days after examination. These entries were deemed excluded under § 1499(c) prior to seizure.\textsuperscript{81} Three additional entries were seized within

\textsuperscript{76} CBP itself has interpreted the statute to mean that an exclusion occurs if CBP does not seize the merchandise within the first 30 days. \textit{See T.D. 99-65, 33 Cus. Bul. 278, 279 (“After 30 days, or such longer period authorized by law, if Customs has not made a determination to release or seize, the goods are deemed to be excluded for purposes of 19 U.S.C. 1514.”)}

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{H.R. REP. NO. 103-361, at 109 (1993).}

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Id. at 110.}

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{See supra} notes 41-46 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Id. at *4.}
thirty days of exam and hence were not deemed excluded. In finding the absence of CIT jurisdiction, the court stated that “this is a seizure case at its heart [and] . . . the fact of seizure trumps the fact of deemed exclusion.”82 Relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1356, the court concluded that jurisdiction lies in the district courts. The court distinguished \textit{CBB Group} on the basis that the seizure occurred prior to commencement of the action in the CIT. The court gave plaintiff an opportunity to request transfer to a district court.83

\textit{PRP Trading} is consistent with the CIT decisions post-dating the Mod Act amendments to § 1499. Nonetheless, the court arguably could have retained jurisdiction over the two entries deemed excluded consistent with \textit{RFJ Fabrics}. As in \textit{RJF Fabrics}, the underlying admissibility issue in \textit{PRP Trading} concerned a determination of country of origin. This substantive issue is one of the core competencies of the CIT. The cases finding jurisdiction lacking notwithstanding a deemed exclusion, such as \textit{Tempco} and \textit{Genii Trading}, largely hinged on the fact that the underlying substantive issue involved trademark law. By no means does this paper advocate that the source of substantive law underpinning the contested admissibility decision should determine CIT jurisdiction. An exclusion based on intellectual property rights84 is just as cognizable in the CIT as an exclusion based on false labeling; much like a federal district can be called upon to decide questions of origin or labeling in a forfeiture proceeding brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1355. However, if there is a deemed or express exclusion brought before the court pursuant to a valid protest, there is sufficient authority to establish that 28 U.S.C. § 1356 does not necessarily “trump” CIT jurisdiction to review the exclusion and determine if the underlying admissibility determination was correct.

82 \textit{Id.} at *6.
83 Over the government’s objection, the court transferred the case to a federal district court on October 10, 2012.
V. Residual jurisdiction under § 1518(i) over detentions, exclusions and seizures

In the absence of a protestable exclusion, several plaintiffs have sought judicial review in the CIT under the so-called residual jurisdiction provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). In most of these cases plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction under § 1581(i)(3), arguing that CBP’s action arose out of a law providing for embargoes or other quantitative restrictions, or under § 1581(i)(4), which grants the CIT jurisdiction over claims arising out of a law providing for “administration or enforcement” of matters provided for elsewhere in § 1581.

The seminal case on residual jurisdiction related to admissibility decisions is K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.\(^8^5\). The plaintiffs in K Mart were not importers of excluded or seized merchandise. Rather, plaintiffs were IP rights holders that filed suit in district court to challenge a CBP regulation, implementing 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a), that failed to prohibit importation of certain gray-market goods.\(^8^6\) The jurisdictional issue in K Mart was whether § 1526(a) was a law providing for “embargoes or other quantitative restrictions” within the meaning of § 1581(i)(3).\(^8^7\) The Court held that an “embargo” under the statute must be a governmentally imposed quantitative restriction of zero.\(^8^8\) The Court further held that § 1526(a) did not impose an embargo because, rather than a governmentally imposed restriction, it was merely a mechanism by which a private party might enlist CBP’s aid in enforcing a private trademark right.\(^8^9\) The Court also held that plaintiff’s claim did not arise out of law providing for

\(^8^6\) Id. at 181.
\(^8^7\) Id. at 183.
\(^8^8\) Id. at 185.
\(^8^9\) Id.
“administration and enforcement” of matters set forth in § 1581 because there was no denied protest.\textsuperscript{90}

In both \textit{RJF Fabrics} and \textit{Milin}, the underlying admissibility decision concerned violations of quota restrictions. In both cases the court stated it would have residual jurisdiction under § 1581(i) on that basis even if there was no protestable exclusion.\textsuperscript{91} These decisions would appear to be unaffected by \textit{K Mart}. However, decisions concerning exclusions and seizures based on trademark or copyright infringement have lead to a different result. Following \textit{K Mart}, the court in \textit{CDCOM} held that seizures based on trademark violations do not implicate the administration or enforcement of embargoes or quantitative restrictions, and consequently the CIT could not assert jurisdiction under § 1581(i).\textsuperscript{92} This issue appears to be well settled in the context of seizures based on trademarks and copyrights.

Not all customs seizures are premised on trademark or copyright violations. Numerous statutes and regulations contain governmentally imposed restrictions or prohibitions on the importation of goods that have nothing to do with the private rights that were found dispositive in \textit{K Mart}. Questions remain as to whether admissibility decisions underlying such seizures are properly reviewable in the CIT under § 1581(i) in the absence of a protestable exclusion. Certainly \textit{RJF Fabrics} and \textit{Milin} would tend to support CIT jurisdiction, provided that the admissibility decision arose out of one of the laws specified in § 1581(i)(1)-(3).

In \textit{Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection}\textsuperscript{93}, an importer of coins seized by CBP filed suit in district court. The coins had been detained upon entry and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{90} Id. at 191.
  \item \textsuperscript{91} Milin Indus., Inc. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int’l Trade 658, 664 (1988); R.J.F. Fabrics, Inc. v. United States, 10 Ct. Int’l Trade 735, 740 (1986).
  \item \textsuperscript{92} CDCOM (U.S.A.) Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 21 Ct. Int’l Trade 435, 440 (1997).
  \item \textsuperscript{93} 801 F. Supp. 2d 383 (D. Md. 2011).
\end{itemize}
were eventually seized three months later.\textsuperscript{94} The underlying basis for seizure was CBP’s determination that the coins were prohibited cultural property under 19 U.S.C. § 2606 and 19 C.F.R. § 12.104.\textsuperscript{95} As the importer did not file a protest, the district court found that jurisdiction would not lie under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a).\textsuperscript{96} Although the district court acknowledged that “the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3)-(4) could be read to confer on the CIT exclusive jurisdiction over this action,” it ultimately concluded that the CIT did not have jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims under § 1581(i).\textsuperscript{97}

The district court focused its analysis on the interplay of 28 U.S.C. § 1356 and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), relying heavily on the so-called carve out in § 1356. Section 1356 confers jurisdiction in the district court “of any seizure under any law of the United States . . . except matters within the jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade under section 1582” of title 28.\textsuperscript{98} The district court concluded that the absence of any reference to § 1581 in the carve out indicated Congressional intent to retain district court jurisdiction in seizure cases that would otherwise fall under CIT jurisdiction under §1581.\textsuperscript{99} The court further noted that the amendment of § 1356 to add the § 1582 carve out was contemporaneous with the enactment of § 1581 and thus indicated Congressional intent to retain district court jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{100} The court expressly declined to decide whether the CBP regulations imposed an “embargo” or “quantitative restriction” on imports within the meaning of § 1581(i)(3).\textsuperscript{101} The district court also noted, though did not

\textsuperscript{94} Id. at 414-15.  
\textsuperscript{95} Id. at 394.  
\textsuperscript{96} Id. at 397 n.9.  
\textsuperscript{97} Id. Defendant did not assert that the CIT had jurisdiction over plaintiff’s action. The court examined jurisdiction sua sponte. Id. at 396.  
\textsuperscript{99} Ancient Coin, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 397.  
\textsuperscript{100} Id.  
\textsuperscript{101} Id. at 398 n.10.
appear to rely upon, the fact that jurisdiction under § 1581(i) is intended to be “residual” and therefore applies only where meaningful judicial review is not otherwise available.\textsuperscript{102}

It is not altogether clear that the district court reached the correct result. The crux of plaintiff’s complaint was not the act of seizure but rather the validity of CBPs regulations.\textsuperscript{103} Plaintiff could have presumably filed a separate declaratory judgment action, in which case § 1356 would not have been relevant to the jurisdictional question. It is quite possible that a district court could conclude that 19 U.S.C. § 2602 imposes an embargo,\textsuperscript{104} in which case the CIT might properly exercise jurisdiction over an action challenging an admissibility decision made pursuant to that statute.\textsuperscript{105}

The question of whether a CBP exclusion from entry arises out of a law providing for “embargoes” has arisen in the context of exclusion orders issued by the International Trade Commission pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d). Once the ITC issues an exclusion order, the statute directs the Secretary of Treasury (delegated to CBP) to “refuse entry” of merchandise covered by the ITC order. If CBP excludes merchandise from entry based upon a finding that the merchandise is covered by the ITC order, then the importer can file a protest under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(4) to challenge the exclusion. The CIT has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) to review denial of the protest, and the court can reach a decision on the merits of the patent issues.\textsuperscript{106}

However, where a patent owner challenged CBP’s failure to exclude merchandise allegedly covered by an exclusion order, the CIT found an absence of jurisdiction. In \textit{Funai

\textsuperscript{102} Id. at 397.
\textsuperscript{103} “ACCG has made clear that its primary purpose in importing the coins at issue and then challenging their seizure was to challenge the validity of the import restrictions in federal court.” \textit{Id.} at 416.
\textsuperscript{104} The author expresses no opinion as to whether 19 U.S.C. § 2602 or 19 C.F.R. § 12.104 impose an “embargo” under the standards of \textit{K Mart}.
\textsuperscript{105} An action brought by the United States for forfeiture under 28 U.S.C. § 1355 and § 1356 would necessarily lie in the district court.
\textsuperscript{106} \textit{See} Jazz Photo Corp. v. United States, 439 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Electric v. United States, the court, citing K Mart, stated that an ITC exclusion order did not involve an embargo or quantitative restriction within the meaning of § 1581(i)(3). The court’s opinion did not provide any further analysis.

Jurisdiction under § 1581(i)(3)-(4) with respect to ITC exclusion orders might be worthy of a second look. In K Mart, the Supreme Court emphasized that the enforcement of § 1526 is entirely in the trademark owners’, not the Government’s control. The Supreme Court also stated that § 1526 was unusual, indicating that its holding might not apply to many other importation prohibitions that relate to intellectual property. The Supreme Court noted:

Section 526 is an unusual (if not unique) breed of importation prohibition in that it takes all control out of the Government's hands and puts it in the hands of private parties. The only other importation prohibitions mentioned by the parties or JUSTICE SCALIA that might even conceivably match that description are the prohibitions of goods that infringe trademarks, see 15 US.C. § 1124, or copyrights, 17 US.C. §§ 601-603.

Whereas § 1526 provides a trademark owner with sole authority to decide whether any products bearing its trademark can be admitted by CBP, and to decide who may import them, § 1337 gives to the government control over determining whether to provide relief, the scope of any relief provided, and the conditions of the relief. Given the volume of § 1337 cases, this jurisdictional issue is likely to surface again.

VI. Conclusion

Judicial review over agency admissibility determinations that involve detentions, exclusions, and seizures plays an important role in the regulation of international trade. Framing the case and choosing the proper venue – the district courts or the CIT – can have a significant

108 Id. at 1357.
110 Id. at 186 n.6.
impact on the ultimate resolution of the case. Even though the district courts have jurisdiction over seizures and actions to forfeit seized property, the CIT has expertise in reviewing administrative decisions by Customs and can play an important role in providing prompt judicial review of admissibility decisions. In determining how to proceed, recent decisions such as *CBB Group* and *PRP Trading* explain the jurisdicational issues that can arise under the CIT’s protest jurisdiction where an exclusion of goods precedes a seizure. Conversely, decisions such as *Ancient Coin* and *Funai Electric* underscore challenges courts face in finding an “embargo” sufficient to trigger the CIT’s residual jurisdiction under §1581(i). In all instances, a practitioner must remain wary of the fact that either court may find that the fact of a CBP “seizure” will in all instances preclude judicial review in the CIT over an admissibility decision that might otherwise be cognizable under protest jurisdiction or the CIT’s residual jurisdiction.

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