TRADE LITIGATION BEFORE THE WTO, NAFTA AND U.S. COURTS: A PETITIONER’S PERSPECTIVE *

by Kathleen W. Cannon

I. OVERVIEW

Trade litigation of agency determinations in antidumping and countervailing duty cases is not limited to disputes before the courts but may also encompass disputes before the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and, where trade with Canada and Mexico is involved, before a binational panel constituted under Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). Variations in the rules that apply and the results that flow from litigation in these different venues have significant repercussions to parties depending on the forum selected for the litigation.

From the perspective of a petitioner or a domestic industry involved in antidumping or countervailing duty cases, the forum options are much more limited than for a respondent or foreign producer/importer. As discussed further below, the WTO is not an option for a petitioner to challenge an agency decision. While the NAFTA Chapter 19 process is technically available, it is rarely the choice of the domestic industry for litigation. Domestic industry petitioners almost always choose to pursue judicial action before the U.S. courts if they wish to appeal an agency’s decision. Nonetheless, domestic industries often become involved in litigation before the WTO and NAFTA binational panels defensively, supporting the U.S. government decision, and even on occasion offensively before NAFTA panels even where they did not choose that forum.

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1 Partner, Kelley, Drye & Warren, Washington, D.C. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Michael J. Kelleher, International Trade Specialist, Kelley, Drye & Warren, in the preparation of this article.
The role of petitioners in these various fora, the relevant standards of review, and the pros and cons of the procedural rules and substantive decision-making applicable in each of these venues, from a petitioner’s perspective, are considered below.

II. WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION

A. Role of Petitioners/U.S. Industry

The domestic industry has no ability to pursue a trade remedy before the WTO or even to participate directly in a WTO dispute settlement body (“DSB”) challenge filed by a foreign government contesting a U.S. antidumping or countervailing duty decision. In WTO cases, only member states may file challenges at the WTO, not private parties. Where the U.S. Department of Commerce or U.S. International Trade Commission has issued a decision, whether favorable or unfavorable to the domestic industry, the United States would not bring an action at the WTO challenging its own decision. Thus, the only WTO challenges to U.S. agency decisions in these trade cases are filed by the governments of the parties’ against which the U.S. findings were issued. The parties to the WTO dispute are the United States and the challenging country government; private parties are not and cannot be parties to these disputes.

As such, there is no ability for the domestic industry to participate directly in the WTO process or to select this forum for litigation. Once a challenge against the United States is filed,

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3 Member governments that have a “substantial interest in a matter before a panel” may also participate in the proceeding as third parties including the right to file written submissions. See DSU, supra note 2, at Article 10 (Third Parties).
U.S. government attorneys will handle the litigation. The private parties are not permitted to file briefs, to present arguments at WTO hearings, or to attend the WTO hearings. This limited role for the domestic industry in litigation that often raises the same issues that would otherwise be raised before the U.S. courts or a NAFTA panel is a significant disadvantage to this forum choice from the domestic industry’s perspective.

Technically, the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) is required to consult with the petitioner “at each stage of the proceeding before the panel or the Appellate Body,” as well as “consider the views of representatives of appropriate interested private sector and nongovernmental organizations” concerning the respective matter. The only official comment opportunity for the domestic industry or other interested U.S. parties, however, is in response to a notice in the Federal Register whenever a panel is selected in which the U.S. is a party. The notice details the nature of the dispute and allows for written comment. Although domestic

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4 See DSU, supra note 2, at Article 6 (Establishment of Panels) and Article 10 (Third Parties). Although the historical WTO practice has been to conduct these DSB hearings behind closed doors, the WTO has recently permitted those expressing an interest in the hearing to observe the hearing on a closed-circuit television in a separate room in certain cases when neither of the member countries to the dispute objected. See WTO Dispute Settlement Proceeding Regarding Measures Related to Zeroing and Certain Investigations, Administrative Reviews and Sunset Reviews Involving Products from the European Communities; Notice of Opportunity to View Non-Confidential Session of Dispute Settlement Panel’s First Meeting with the Parties, 72 Fed. Reg. 61,409 (USTR Oct. 30, 2007).


6 19 U.S.C. § 3537(b).

industries may and occasionally do submit comments in response to these notices, those comments tend for the most part to be fairly simple, setting forth a position but without providing a great deal of detailed legal or factual argumentation. Strategically, because briefs will later be submitted to the WTO DSB, the U.S. industry may not find it useful to provide a roadmap to likely arguments so early in the process. It is generally more productive to work with the U.S. attorneys on the case to develop detailed arguments for presentation in the U.S. government’s brief rather than putting them on the public record in response to this initial USTR notice.

Although there is no direct role for petitioners in WTO litigation, petitioners are often involved in assisting the U.S. government attorneys with the preparation of the case. This involvement is at the discretion of the U.S. attorney, so varies from case to case. In some cases, petitioners assist in drafting sections of briefs, providing substantive edits and input to briefs or responses to panel questions, working with U.S. attorneys in preparatory moot courts, and traveling to Geneva when the WTO hearings take place to discuss issues with U.S. government counsel during breaks or at the end of each day of hearings. Again, however, the extent of domestic industry participation in this process and the degree to which any of the petitioner’s drafts, suggested edits or responses are accepted is purely within the discretion and control of the U.S. attorneys handling the case.

The WTO DSB has also shown some receptivity to submissions of amicus briefs, generally by non-government organizations (“NGOs”). Even where these briefs are accepted,

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however, the role of amici is limited and does not extend even to observer-status at the hearing. Further, depending on the perspective of the U.S. government and that of amici, the U.S. government may not support or encourage submission of amicus briefs on its behalf.

While counsel for domestic industries have a very limited role in WTO cases, the same cannot be said of counsel for respondent parties in trade cases. Although WTO cases are brought by foreign governments and not by the private respondent parties, it is often the case that the foreign government includes as part of its delegation U.S. counsel who were representing the respondents at the agency level. Respondents’ counsel generally have a direct and, indeed, often the lead role in drafting briefs and presenting arguments in hearings to the WTO panels and Appellate Body.

Thus, from a domestic industry’s vantage, the WTO dispute settlement process is not an advantageous forum in terms of the rights of participation or the role permitted for domestic parties. Notably, however, there is nothing in the WTO rules that precludes the U.S. government from including as part of its delegation attorneys representing the U.S. parties to the case as other countries do.⁹ Even were the U.S. government attorneys to retain the lead role in these WTO disputes, it would be a major step forward for counsel to domestic industries to be officially included in this process as part of the U.S. delegation, including being permitted into the room to witness and, as appropriate, contribute to the presentation of arguments defending the U.S. decision in the case that they originally filed and in which they are heavily invested.

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B. Standard of Review by DSU Panels and Appellate Body

The application by WTO dispute settlement bodies of the standard of review set forth in the Antidumping Agreement has been the subject of extensive debate and analysis. Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement sets forth the applicable standard of review as follows:

(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether the authorities’ establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned;

(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities’ measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.

Where the Appellate Body is concerned, its role is to review whether panels have interpreted and applied the standard of review properly and to uphold, modify or reverse panel actions.

The Article 17.6(ii) standard is similar to the deferential standard of review articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council*. Indeed, during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the United States sought inclusion of a deferential standard of review to limit the ability of the WTO DSB to substitute its own

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11 Antidumping Agreement, Art. 17.6.

judgments for that of the Member states.\textsuperscript{13} Upon adoption of the Article 17.6(ii) standard, the United States indeed believed that it had succeeded in imposing a \textit{Chevron}-type of deferential analysis on the review to be used in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Indeed, the Statement of Administrative Action ("SAA") promulgated in conjunction with passage of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994), described the Article 17.6 standard of review as "analogous to the deferential standard applied by U.S. courts in reviewing actions by Commerce and the Commission."\textsuperscript{14}

Unfortunately from the vantage of the U.S. negotiators who "succeeded" in obtaining adoption of the review standard set forth in Article 17.6(ii) of the Antidumping Agreement, as well as from the vantage of U.S. industries that are parties to antidumping cases, the deference anticipated by application of this standard has not been true in practice under the WTO dispute settlement system. Despite the seemingly deferential standard, WTO panels and the Appellate Body do not defer to a national authority’s legal interpretation of the Antidumping Agreement.\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, "no adopted panel or Appellate Body decision has ever found that there is more than one permissible construction of the Antidumping Agreement, even if they are selecting the seventh


\textsuperscript{14} Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action ("SAA"), H.R. Doc. No. 103-316(I) at 818 (1994).

\textsuperscript{15} Holger Spamann, \textit{Standard of Review for WTO Panels in Trade Remedy Cases: a Critical Analysis}, 38 J. World Trade 509, 511 (2004) ("Regarding legal interpretations, Article 17.6(ii) ADP has not yet led any Panel or the AB to defer to a national authorities’ interpretation. The practical impact of Article 17.6 ADP has thus been rather small.").
dictionary definition as the ‘sole’ permissible construction.”\(^\text{16}\) Instead, WTO panels and the Appellate Body consistently determine, even where the Antidumping Agreement is completely silent on an issue, that they can interpret from other language of the Agreement or by applying customary rules of international law, the legal requirements of the Agreement.\(^\text{17}\)

As a result, on a wide range of issues for which there was no agreement among negotiating members during the Uruguay Round and, therefore, no mention of the issue in the Antidumping Agreement, WTO panels and the Appellate Body have nonetheless “interpreted” the Agreement to permit only one outcome. Findings based on alternative and, arguably, permissible interpretations of the international agreements by the administrating authorities in the Member countries are consistently rejected by the WTO DSB. The Appellate Body has taken the view that, where the agreements are silent on an issue, the DSB can and should fill in gaps in the agreements based on its own views without deferring to Member’s interpretations.\(^\text{18}\) Under this approach, the Appellate Body is essentially legislating a new body of law to which the Members never agreed.\(^\text{19}\)

Most notable in this regard are the numerous WTO dispute settlement decisions finding that the U.S. practice of “zeroing” is not permitted by the Agreement.\(^\text{20}\) The United States


expressed serious concern that the Appellate Body’s decision on zeroing was being “applauded” for achieving something the negotiators could not achieve – the elimination of zeroing. As such, the Appellate Body’s decision “has added to or diminished rights and obligations actually agreed to by Members . . . .” 21 In a communication from the United States to the WTO addressing the Appellate Body’s decision in the stainless steel from Mexico case, the United States expressed grave concern with the Appellate Body’s development and imposition of new rights and obligations never agreed to by the negotiating member governments: “The Division’s casual dismissal of the negotiating history and imputing into the agreed text obligations that do not appear there should give every Member pause, particularly at a time when Members are negotiating a new set of rights and obligations . . . .” 22 The United States further noted with concern the Appellate Body’s decision in the Mexican stainless steel case that, for the first time, suggested that a panel must follow the Appellate Body reasoning or be operating at odds with the “promotion of security and predictability” and the “prompt settlement of disputes.” 23

Where subsidy issues arise under the SCM Agreement, 24 the applicable WTO standard of review is even less deferential. The WTO applies Article 11 of the Dispute Settlement

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23 Id. at ¶ 12 (citing Appellate Body Report, United States - Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico (“US – Stainless Steel”), ¶¶ 160-161, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008)).

Understanding (“DSU”) in resolving subsidy disputes arising under the SCM Agreement.  

Article 11 states:

[A] panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements.

The Appellate Body has observed that in a panel’s review under Article 11 of facts established by an investigating authority, “a panel may not conduct a de novo review of the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the competent authorities.”

The United States had taken the position that, based on the negotiations during the Uruguay Round as well as the WTO Ministerial Declaration, the standard of review applied in Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement should apply as well to disputes arising under the SCM Agreement. The WTO Appellate Body disagreed, setting forth its view of this issue in the DRAMS case as follows:

25 See Panel Report, Japan - Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories from Korea, at ¶ 4.208, WT/DS336/R (July 13, 2007) (citing Appellate Body Report, United States - Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea, at ¶ 182, WTO/DS296/AB/R (July 20, 2005). Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding is also cited on occasion by panels and the Appellate Body regarding the principles applicable to interpreting the WTO, even though it is not identified as a standard of review. Article 3.2 recognizes that the dispute settlement system is intended “to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements,” “to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law,” and not to “add or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.”


The Panel and both participants have recognized that the Appellate Body has in the past elaborated on the standard of review mandated by Article 11 with respect to factual and legal issues in the context of claims under the Agreement on Safeguards. The standard of review articulated by the Appellate Body in the context of agency determinations under that Agreement is instructive for cases under the SCM Agreement that also involve agency determinations. Nevertheless, we recall that an “objective assessment” under Article 11 of the DSU must be understood in the light of the obligations of the particular covered agreement at issue in order to derive the more specific contours of the appropriate standard of review. In this respect, we are especially mindful, in this appeal, of Articles 12, 19, and 22 of the SCM Agreement.28

Although the United States and domestic industries initially perceived it to be a significant setback that the deferential Article 17.6(ii) standard of review from the Antidumping Agreement was not being extended and applied to disputes arising under the SCM Agreement, in practice there has not been any appreciable difference in outcomes based on the varying standards applied. Given the lack of deference accorded to Member’s decisions by panels and the Appellate Body in disputes arising under the Antidumping Agreement, the effect of applying a supposedly more rigorous review standard of Article 11 to SCM Agreement disputes has not been significant.

From a petitioner’s vantage, the manner in which the WTO dispute settlement bodies have interpreted and applied the standards of review in both antidumping and countervailing duty cases is of great concern. Given that domestic industries involved in WTO proceedings... (continued)

Pursuant to the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 or Part V of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“the Declaration”).

government position, they only stand to lose from application of a standard of review that does not accord deference to the U.S. government.

C. **Procedural Pros and Cons of WTO Process**

When weighing the pros and cons of participating in the WTO process as opposed to other fora from a domestic industry perspective, one benefit is that the findings of the WTO panel or Appellate Body are not self-implementing. Implementation of WTO decisions in U.S. law is addressed in section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”).²⁹ It is up to each Member country whose decision has not been sustained either to attempt to bring its measures into compliance with the WTO ruling or be subject to possible retaliation for not doing so.³⁰ In a best-case scenario for the U.S. industry, the WTO DSB will sustain a U.S. decision in favor of a domestic industry and preserve the status quo. In a worst-case scenario, the WTO will reject a U.S. decision in whole or in substantial part, potentially leading to revocation of the order. Accordingly, it is useful for a U.S. industry to have some ability to work with the U.S. government in either implementing the WTO holding in as positive a way as possible from the industry’s perspective or in urging the U.S. government not to implement the decision. In practice, however, the U.S. government has almost always implemented WTO DSB decisions, in an attempt to ensure similar acceptance of the WTO rulings by its trading partners, even in instances in which the United States has expressed disagreement with the holding.


Another positive procedural aspect of WTO decisions is that they have prospective effect only.\textsuperscript{31} Section 129(c)(1) states that if the Commerce Department or International Trade Commission revise an antidumping or countervailing duty decision as a result of a WTO case, the revised determinations have prospective effect only.\textsuperscript{32} Thus, as the Statement of Administrative Action recognizes, relief available from the WTO differs from relief available from the U.S. courts or a NAFTA panel, both of which may provide retroactive relief.\textsuperscript{33}

Given, again, that WTO decisions will either merely preserve the status quo or will overturn some aspect of a U.S. decision in the petitioner’s favor, the absence of retrospective relief is important and helpful. Even where orders are found by the WTO DSB to be unlawfully imposed, their revocation has been prospective consistent with U.S. law rather than being void ab initio.\textsuperscript{34} Further, because equitable measures such as injunctions are not possible in WTO litigation, the prospective relief generally only applies to future, and not past, entries.

A final positive, procedural consideration for WTO cases is that the timetable for dispute settlement at the WTO can be fairly prompt. The WTO dispute settlement system is designed to conclude cases brought before a panel within roughly one year, beginning with a 60-day

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{31} Id. at 825 (citing NSK Ltd. v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1287 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2005) (“Retroactivity is not favored in the law’’)).}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{32} 19 U.S.C. § 3538(c)(1).}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{33} SAA at 1026.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{34} See Notice of Implementation Under Section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act; Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Steel Products from the European Communities, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,858, 64,859 (Dep’t Commerce Nov. 17, 2003) (Commerce applied modified privatization methodology consistent with Appellate Body findings with respect to twelve CVD determinations involving certain steel products from various member states of the European Communities “only with respect to unliquidated entries of merchandise entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the date on which the USTR direct(ed) the Department to implement that determination” because “‘such determinations have prospective effect only.’”’} (quoting SAA at 1026).}
consultation period, 45 days for a panel appointment, roughly six months for the panel to conduct hearings and issue its report, and a further 60 days for adoption of the panel’s report.\(^{35}\) In addition, the countries can settle their dispute themselves at any stage.\(^{36}\) In practice, however, delay often occurs and extensions may be taken by the panel, so that actual resolution of the matter takes longer.

Where a challenge to the Appellate Body is initiated in an antidumping case, the timelines are very abbreviated as compared to judicial appeals. Notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days of the final panel decision, appellant’s written submissions within merely seven days of the notice, and a hearing generally within 35 to 45 days of the notice.\(^{37}\) The Appellate Body report is then due within 90 days of notice and adoption is to take place within 30 days.\(^{38}\) While delays and extensions can occur, the Appellate Body timeline is designed to add only another three to four months to the review process – quite a record as compared to other trade fora.

In the end, however, there is often a lengthy period before any change to a legal measure or administrative decision is in fact implemented. Extensive delays occur as members determine whether, when and how to implement a decision or as chosen methods of implementation are

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\(^{36}\) Id.


\(^{38}\) Id.
further contested. Thus the potential benefits of the abbreviated briefing and initial DSB decision periods are undermined by delays in implementation.

There are also a number of negative procedural aspects to litigation at the WTO from the domestic industry’s vantage. The WTO does not have specific procedures for handling business proprietary information. Although members have in certain cases and upon agreement used confidential information in arguments presented, there is no protective order process at the WTO and the ability to use this type of information is somewhat limited. Inability to rely on confidential information may, in turn, impede the ability to present arguments. Because domestic industries are not parties to the case, counsel no longer may retain business proprietary data under an agency protective order during the WTO process, severely limiting data analysis by domestic industries seeking to assist the U.S. attorneys handling the matter.

A further negative procedural aspect of the WTO process is the absence of any real limit on the number or types of issues raised. Unlike the limitations imposed under U.S. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), precluding frivolous causes of action, WTO complainants have no

39 The rule on treatment of confidential information in antidumping litigation at the WTO is set forth in Article 17.7 as follows:

Confidential information provided to the panel shall not be disclosed without formal authorization from the person, body or authority providing such information. Where such information is requested from the panel but release of such information by the panel is not authorized, a non-confidential summary of the information, authorized by the person, body or authority providing the information, shall be provided.

40 See Panel Report, United States - Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, ¶ 52, WT/DS268/RW (Nov. 30, 2006) (“Panel affirmed that it had the right to seek, and the United States had an obligation to provide, data designated as business proprietary information” from Commerce proceeding) (citing Panel Report, United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, ¶ 6.4-6.7, at WT/DS138/R and Coor. 2 (June 7, 2000)).
such limitation. Although one might anticipate that Member nations would only raise before the WTO DSB issues of the most egregious concern, and would exercise restraint in raising more minor issues, the opposite appears to be true. When a WTO challenge is filed, often a wide variety of issues are raised, causing parties, panels and the Appellate Body to address many factual and legal arguments, no matter how far-fetched. The absence of any page limitations on briefs submitted to the WTO is not helpful in discouraging parties from raising a multitude of issues rather than winnowing down their challenges to a select few.

A final negative aspect of the WTO DSB process from a U.S. petitioner’s perspective is the issue of potential disagreement between the U.S. government and U.S. petitioners in these challenges. Even when a U.S. petitioner is aligned with and defending a U.S. decision, it may disagree with the approach and arguments presented by the government. Having no role in the WTO process, however, petitioners can do little but express their concerns to the U.S. attorneys.

These different positions, however, may have real effects on WTO litigation and remedies. In the steel privatization cases discussed further in section V.C., the U.S. took the position that the statute did not require the methodology it had adopted. The WTO Appellate Body agreed, but nonetheless found the U.S. change-in-ownership methodology in violation of the international agreement. The United States was thus free to change its privatization practice under section 123, to the detriment of the U.S. industry, merely after consultations and providing comment opportunities, and did so. The new policy adopted by the United States basically presumed that subsidies were eliminated once a change-in-ownership occurred, quite

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41 Appellate Body Report, United States Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from European Communities, ¶¶ 159-61, WT/DS212/AB/R (Dec. 9, 2002).
the opposite of the previous policy, and all to the disadvantage of U.S. producers harmed by these subsidized imports.

Although this result may have been preferable from the vantage of the Administration, which could implement a new methodology without Congress approving new legislation, it was not a positive outcome for the domestic industry. Obtaining a legislative change by Congress to a statutory provision it had recently adopted stating that changes in ownership did not automatically lead to elimination of subsidies would likely have been difficult to achieve, thus preserving the status quo for U.S. industries. By bypassing Congress and the need for a legislative amendment, and instead unilaterally altering its methodology, the Administration implemented a WTO decision that hurt U.S. industries without any real opportunity for Congress or the U.S. industry to intercede in the process.

D. Substantive Results/Effect on Domestic Industry

The substantive effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions in the antidumping and countervailing duty context, as applied to domestic industries, has generally been negative. Any WTO challenge in which a domestic industry is involved can at best lead to preservation of the status quo, if the U.S. succeeds on all counts. More often, however, these decisions lead to a diminution of dumping margins or subsidies, if not outright revocation of an order or rejection of an injury finding by the Commission. The track record of the WTO DSB is not good for domestic industry petitioners. The WTO DSB rules far more frequently in favor of complainants and against Member nations, whether the United States or other countries, that are applying antidumping or countervailing measures.\footnote{Stewart, Dwyer & Hein, \textit{supra} note 16, at 251-52, 255.} As a result, when confronted with a WTO challenge, domestic industries are justifiably concerned that no matter how legally sound and factually
supported a decision in their favor might be, there is a high likelihood the WTO panel or Appellate Body will find some failure to comply with the international agreements.\footnote{See Michael J. Shumaker, \textit{Tearing the Fabric of the World Trade Organization: United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton}, 32 N.C.J. Int'l L & Comm. Reg. 547, 577-78 (2007) ("As one commentator stated, ‘since complainants win the vast majority of cases in which they are involved, it is expected that complainants will continue to bring disputes to the WTO.’") (citing Sue Mota, \textit{The World Trade Organization: An Analysis of Disputes}, 25 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 75,104 (1999)).}

Why this pattern has emerged at the WTO DSB has been the subject of much debate and analysis. One commentator suggested the WTO DSB employs a “results-oriented exercise of discretion” raising concerns as to “an institutional bias against the use of WTO-consistent measures.”\footnote{Stewart, Dwyer & Hein, \textit{supra} note 16, at 254.} Another commentator has found that the Appellate Body paid little attention to the standard of review in at least one case in order to produce an “even-handed” outcome.\footnote{Tarullo, \textit{supra} note 17, at 139-40.} The U.S. agencies involved in trade remedy actions have said that the WTO has improperly applied Article 17.6(ii) because it “has not applied the article in a way that allows for upholding permissible interpretations of WTO members’ domestic agencies.”\footnote{GAO Report entitled: \textit{World Trade Organization: Standard of Review and Impact of Trade Remedy Rulings} at 7 (July 2003), \textit{available at} http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03824.pdf.}

Notably, the former Chairman of the WTO Appellate Body was quite candid in stating that he viewed it as his role to resolve through dispute settlement what had not been resolved by consensus during the negotiations:

\begin{quote}
We also need a better understanding – and a stronger consensus – among all of the Members of the WTO on the balance they are seeking in the WTO treaty between their right to apply trade remedies and their right to benefit from trade concessions through market access.
\end{quote}
We need more and better rules as part of the WTO treaty on the appropriate interrelationship between trade and the environment, trade and labor, trade and health, trade and human rights, trade and intellectual property, trade and bribery, and trade law and international law.

Ideally, none of these issues should be resolved in WTO dispute settlement. Ideally, none of them should be resolved by panels or by the Appellate Body. As I see it, all of these procedural and substantive issues – and many more of similar significance and sensitivity – should, ideally, be resolved by negotiations that result in a consensus and an agreement by the Members of the WTO on rules that take the form of WTO treaty obligations.

But, again, the Members of the WTO should be mindful that the world will not wait. The world will keep turning. If these issues are not resolved, clearly, through negotiations, then many of them will be resolved, necessarily, through dispute settlement.

Where matters are not resolved in the negotiations, however, and the international agreements are silent, the fundamental principles of the Vienna Convention as well as the plain language of Article 17.6(ii), indicate that the absence of consent to the imposition of new obligations should lead to deference by the WTO DSB to the Member’s interpretation. That the world will “keep turning” does not mean that the WTO Appellate Body must step in to replace a negotiated agreement between Member states with its own view of the law. Instead, if the plain language of Article 17.6(ii) were properly being applied by the WTO DSB, an issue that was not resolved by negotiations or addressed in the international agreements would be precisely an area in which deference to the Member state’s decision was in order.

Of further substantive concern from a domestic industry’s vantage is the precedential effect many of these WTO dispute settlement decisions are having. Technically, WTO dispute

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settlement decisions are to apply only in the context of the specific dispute in which they were raised.\textsuperscript{49} Although panels and the Appellate Body have cited to and relied upon the reasoning of prior decisions particularly of the Appellate Body, until this year there was no indication that the Appellate Body viewed its decisions as precedential. In the stainless steel from Mexico case, however, the Appellate Body chastised a panel for failing to follow an earlier holding by the Appellate Body in the zeroing context, stating:

\begin{quote}
The Panel’s failure to follow previously adopted Appellate Body reports addressing the same issues undermines the development of a coherent and predictable body of jurisprudence clarifying Members’ rights and obligations under the covered agreements as contemplated under the DSU. . . .

We are deeply concerned about the Panel’s decision to depart from well-established Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying the interpretation of the same legal issues. The Panel’s approach has serious implications for the proper functioning of the WTO dispute settlement systems, as explained above.\textsuperscript{50}
\end{quote}

This finding by the Appellate Body is a highly disturbing new development in the jurisprudence of the WTO. As reflected by the United States in a recent communication to the WTO on the Appellate Body’s decision in the Mexico stainless steel case: “Suggesting, as this Division did, that panels are required blindly to follow erroneous Appellate Body conclusions in the name of security and predictability is simply inconsistent with Article 3.2.”\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{49} See Corus Staal BV v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1264 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2003), aff’d upon remand, 395 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“WTO decisions appear to have very limited precedential value and are binding only upon the particular countries involved. They are not binding upon other signatory countries or future WTO panels”).

\textsuperscript{50} Appellate Body Report, United States - Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, ¶¶ 161-62, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008).

\textsuperscript{51} Communication from the United States, US – Stainless Steel, supra note 22, at ¶ 12.
The nature of WTO litigation is also substantively different from other litigation because it directly involves attorneys with the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office and, thus, is subject to a different level of analysis with respect to certain policy issues. USTR considers the ramifications of various arguments and issues not simply within the context of the immediate case or even the implementation of U.S. antidumping or subsidy laws, but more broadly with respect to how certain arguments by the United States could affect other WTO cases or potential cases. Although this approach is understandable, the domestic industry may find that issues that were otherwise straightforward in their favor and supported by the Commerce Department or International Trade Commission are now subject to a different type of scrutiny and not always ultimately supported by USTR attorneys due to broader policy considerations.

III. NAFTA PANELS AND THE ECC

A. Role of Petitioners/U.S. Industry

Unlike the WTO where domestic industry petitioners are permitted no direct role in the litigation, domestic parties are given full rights to participate in challenges brought before a NAFTA panel. Domestic parties may file a challenge and seek a NAFTA panel or may intervene formally in a NAFTA challenge brought by a Mexican or Canadian party to support the U.S. government decision being challenged. As complainants or intervenors in a NAFTA case, domestic industries enjoy the rights and obligations of the other parties.

52 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(9) (representation in panel proceedings and “interested parties” right to appear).

While U.S. industries have the right to bring a challenge before a NAFTA panel, it is almost never the case that domestic petitioners opt for NAFTA litigation over litigation before a U.S. court. The main reason for this forum choice is that, as discussed below, NAFTA panels have tended to overturn the U.S. government’s imposition of antidumping or countervailing duty measures much more frequently than is true of the courts. For this same reason, where a respondent in a U.S. trade action involving Mexico or Canada wants to challenge a U.S. decision, it is far more likely to bring the action to a NAFTA panel rather than seeking U.S. judicial review.

The unique aspect to NAFTA litigation, however, is that domestic industries do not have a unilateral choice of forum where cases involve imports from Canada or Mexico. By law, in cases involving imports from a NAFTA country, binational panel review was intended to be the rule, subject to limited exception. Similar to court appeals, parties are given thirty days to file a request for panel review of an agency action involving NAFTA imports. The law also provides, however, that judicial review in a U.S. court of agency action on NAFTA cases is possible in limited circumstances. Specifically, if a party is interested in judicial review by a U.S. court of an agency decision on a NAFTA country, it must provide notice of its intent to file such appeal within 20 days of the date of the determination being challenged.

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54 Indeed, the only time to the author’s knowledge that a U.S. petitioner has affirmatively requested a NAFTA panel is in a recently filed case, *Certain Welded Large Diameter Line Pipe*, USA-MEX-2007-1904-03, in which petitioners are challenging a negative decision of the International Trade Commission.

55 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g).


The notice of intent provides other parties to the case with the opportunity to opt for NAFTA binational panel review in lieu of court review if they so choose within the 10 days remaining in which to request a Chapter 19 panel. Any party that would prefer NAFTA binational panel review over judicial review, therefore, has the right to select that forum. Article 1909(11) of the NAFTA forecloses U.S. court review if any party requests a binational panel. Moreover, where the 20-day notice of intent to file an appeal in a U.S. court has not been properly provided, the U.S. courts have dismissed appeals for failing to comply with these statutory requirements.58

Accordingly, by law, even if domestic parties prefer U.S. judicial review to NAFTA binational panel review, they are not able to select this forum if an opposing party prefers the binational panel alternative, as is generally the case.59 Although some NAFTA-country challenges have been raised in U.S. courts, it has been more often the case that reviews of U.S. trade decisions involving Canada or Mexico take place before NAFTA binational panels rather than before U.S. courts. Thus, although domestic industries can seek U.S. court review if they so choose in a NAFTA-country case, they cannot prevent an opposing party from replacing judicial review with NAFTA binational panel review.

58 See, e.g., Desert Glory, Ltd. v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1340-44 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2005). In the Desert Glory case and others involving scope determinations, issues have also arisen regarding when notice has been provided to trigger the statutory deadlines.

59 See, e.g., Live Swine from Canada, USA-94-1904-01, 1995 FTAPD LEXIS 12, Decision of the Panel at *1-2, 28-29 (May 30, 1995); Pure Magnesium and Alloy Magnesium from Canada (CVD), USA-CDA-00-1904-07, 2002 FTAPD LEXIS 2, Decision of the Panel at *34-36, 38-38 (Mar. 27, 2002); Oil Country Tubular Goods from Mexico; Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, USA-95-1904-04, 1996 FTAPD LEXIS 2, Decision of the Panel at *3-4, 100-02 (July 31, 1996).
B. **Standard of Review**

1. **Binational Panel Review**

NAFTA binational panels are to apply the standard of review that would be applied by a national court reviewing an antidumping or countervailing duty decision.\(^{60}\) In U.S. law, therefore, panels are to apply the standard of review that would be applied by the courts under 19 U.S.C. \(\S\) 1516a(b). For final decisions by Commerce or the U.S. International Trade Commission, that standard asks whether the agency’s determination is supported by substantial evidence of record or is otherwise consistent with law.\(^{61}\)

The definition of the standard of review for NAFTA panels, therefore, is the same as for U.S. courts. One would anticipate, accordingly, that the same or similar results would occur irrespective of the venue selected. That has not, however, been the case. Almost from the outset of implementation of the binational panel process, questions have been raised and panel decisions criticized for failing to apply the proper U.S. standard of review.\(^{62}\) In particular, NAFTA panels have frequently not deferred to agency decision-making under circumstances where a U.S. court would likely have done so.\(^{63}\)

\(^{60}\) North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Ch. 19, art. 1904(3). See also NAFTA Annex 1911.

\(^{61}\) 19 U.S.C. \(\S\) 1516a(b)(1)(B).


\(^{63}\) One member of an Extraordinary Challenge Committee (“ECC”) questioned the degree of deference that a dissenting colleague urged was appropriate in these cases, stating: “In my opinion, however, he is demanding almost absolute deference leaving almost no breathing space for a reviewing tribunal. If this is the correct law to apply then there is no need for a binational panel under the FTA.” *Softwood Lumber Products from Canada*, ECC-94-1904-01USA, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11, Memorandum Opinion and Orders at *81 (Aug. 3, 1994) (Justice Hart).
The manner in which the standard of review has been applied and the deference accorded by NAFTA panels to U.S. agency decisions has varied widely and appears largely to reflect the composition of the particular panel at issue. In a recent case involving a sunset review of an antidumping order on stainless steel sheet and strip from Mexico, the NAFTA panel sustained a finding of the U.S. International Trade Commission in full, finding the decision to be supported by substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance with law.\textsuperscript{64} Notably, at the end of its decision, the Panel set forth a general conclusion that emphasized that, under U.S. law, the “possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence” and that a NAFTA panel is not to “substitute its judgment” for that of the agency.\textsuperscript{65} Were all NAFTA panels to adhere to the standard of review that this stainless steel sheet panel applied, the very different pattern of results between the U.S. courts and NAFTA panels that has occurred (see section III.D, \textit{infra}) likely would not exist.

Unfortunately, most NAFTA panels appear to have merely applied lip service to the U.S. standard of review, while substituting their own judgment for that of the U.S. agencies. In the first softwood lumber challenge, the panel essentially found that there was more than one reasonable interpretation of the evidence, preferred its own interpretation to that of the United


\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Id.} at 10-11 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984), and American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1273, 1276 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1984), aff’d sub nom. Armco, Inc. v. United States, 760 F.2d 249 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
States, and remanded the matter to the agency for reconsideration.\textsuperscript{66} Similarly, in the \textit{Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork} case, the panel found conflicting evidence regarding underselling by imports but did not defer to the Commission’s conclusions on the issue, rather substituting its own judgment.\textsuperscript{67} Following a remand determination in which the Commission further discussed the evidence and the panel’s concerns but nonetheless again issued an affirmative injury finding, the panel continued to find fault with the agency’s decision.

At this point, the panel did not simply remand yet again to the Commission but directed the Commission to find no injury.\textsuperscript{68} Other NAFTA panels in more recent cases have similarly directed the agencies to issue final decisions without giving any real opportunity to address the issues on remand. In \textit{Softwood Lumber}, for example, a binational panel remanded to the Commission with very explicit instructions to issue a negative determination on threat of injury.\textsuperscript{69} Following the panel's determination, the Commission issued a negative threat determination but noted “we disagree with the Panel’s view that there is no substantial evidence to support a finding of threat of material injury and we continue to view the Panel's decisions


throughout this proceeding as overstepping its authority, violating the NAFTA, seriously departing from fundamental rules of procedure, and committing legal error.”

In a request for ECC review in the lumber case, the ECC recognized first that the panel’s power is similar to that of the CIT, which is “normally limited to remanding” the matter to the agency for reconsideration but “does not authorize the court to, in effect, reverse the agency’s decision.” Nonetheless, the ECC found that the Panel had not “manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction” because it had remanded the matter to the Commission “to enter a negative threat determination.” How, precisely, one draws the line between a conclusion that reversal of an agency decision is improper but that a remand with express instructions to issue a particular result is permissible is difficult to fathom. Indeed, the Commission found it had no choice in response to the Panel’s instructions but to issue a negative decision in the lumber case.

Although the U.S. appellate court has not expressly held that the lower court may not reverse the agency as opposed to remanding, it has in dicta stated: “{s}ection 1516a limits the Court of International Trade to affirmances and remand orders; an outright reversal without remand does not appear to be contemplated by the statute.” The ECC conclusion that the

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72 Id. at 67-68.
74 Altx, Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1108, 1111 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2004). But see Atlantic Sugar, Ltd.v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Ten years before the court’s decision in Altx, the court also in dicta indicated that an absence of substantial evidence would lead to either reversal or remand). In Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, the appellate court reversed (...continued)
NAFTA panel may permissibly dictate a result rather than permitting the Commission to come to its own conclusion raises grave concerns as to potential panel overreaching and supplanting of agency decision-making.

Perhaps most notable, however, in terms of the proper legal standards to be applied by NAFTA panels are the conflicting views NAFTA panels have issued on the question of whether they are required to apply as precedent holdings of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. When this issue was reviewed by the Panel examining corrosion-resistant flat products from Canada in 2004, the Panel found that it was “bound by judicial precedents of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and by the United States Supreme Court.”

Similarly, the Extraordinary Challenge Committee observed in *Live Swine from Canada* that “{a}lthough Panels substitute for the Court of International Trade in reviewing Commerce determinations, they are not appellate courts” and “must show deference to an investigating authority’s determinations.” These conclusions seemed unremarkable and rather obvious at the time, given the mandate under NAFTA Chapter 19 that panels must apply the law of the subject country.

(...continued)


77 NAFTA, Article 1904 (“{T}he panel shall apply the standard of review set out in Annex 1911 and the general legal principles that a court of the importing Party otherwise would apply to a review of a determination of the competent investigating authority.”).

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Subsequently, however, in a decision handed down in 2007 on carbon wire rod from Canada, the NAFTA panel majority determined that it was not bound to apply holdings by either the U.S. Court of International Trade or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in reaching its decision. While acknowledging that the issue of whether binational panels must follow Federal Circuit decisions “may not be free from doubt,” the panel concluded that it was “replacing judicial review” and, as such, need not follow U.S. appellate court precedent:

We conclude that NAFTA Article 1904.2’s specification of “a court” of the importing Party, the United States here, means neither the CIT nor the Federal Circuit. Perforce it means a generic or virtual United States court reviewing final Commerce determinations, as described in NAFTA Chapter 19. This generic or virtual court is not situated within the regime of, or bound by, decisions of the CIT or the Federal Circuit.

We further conclude that such a generic, virtual court (and this binational Panel) in determining whether the final determination before us is supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law, would and must first determine, applying judicial standards, the extent to which such virtual United States court would rely on relevant decisions and other materials. In particular, in deciding questions of law of first impression in its jurisdiction, the virtual court should and would give full, thoughtful and respectful consideration to the decisions of the CIT and Federal Circuit. Such a virtual court should nonetheless look on those precedents like another United States Court of Appeals or a state supreme court would look upon them or another state supreme court decision. A decision whether to adopt a CIT or Federal Circuit decision should be primarily based on how relevant, well thought through and persuasive the decision appears to be in the context of the factual record presented.

Two members of the wire rod panel dissented, finding that binational panels are not permitted to depart from Federal Circuit precedent:


79 *Id.* at 21 (footnotes and citations omitted).
we disagree with the majority in the capacity of Panels to depart from established CAFC precedent. In our view such precedents ought to be followed unless there are exceptional circumstances to the contrary. It would be so even if we stood in the shoes of the CAFC itself. . . . It is particularly so given the political history that attended the establishment of the Panels (ably described by the majority subject to our comments about motivation above) and the caution expressed by the Extraordinary Challenge Committee in the Live Swine case.80

The failure of a panel to follow holdings by the Federal Circuit based on its perception that the NAFTA Article 1904.2 language applies only to a “virtual” court and not the Court of International Trade or the Federal Circuit, is a disturbing development. Prior to the Canadian wire rod decision, although questions were raised as to whether panels had afforded sufficient deference to an agency decision under the standard of review, no panel had affirmatively stated that it was refusing to follow, and did not believe it was required to apply, judicial precedent of the Federal Circuit. Although the wire rod decision was not subject to an Extraordinary Challenge Committee review, it appears that this holding, more than any other holding by a panel to date, was of sufficient gravity to invoke even the very high standards required for an ECC review, as turned to next.

2. **ECC Standard**

Unlike the WTO Appellate Body and U.S. appellate court, which essentially apply the same standard of review as the WTO panel or the U.S. Court of International Trade, respectively, a very different standard of review applies to review of NAFTA panel decisions. The Extraordinary Challenge Committee is charged with determining only whether such gross misconduct or aberrant decision-making by a NAFTA panel has occurred that the integrity of the

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80 *Id.* at 73 (dissenting views of Barr and Liebman).
process is threatened.\textsuperscript{81} The applicable standard for an ECC requires first that there be gross misconduct or a serious conflict of interest by a panelist, a serious departure by a panel from a fundamental procedural rule, or that the panel manifestly exceeded its authority, “for example by failing to apply the appropriate standard of review.”\textsuperscript{82} In addition, even where any of these factors exist, the ECC must further find that the actions both materially affected the Panel’s decision and threaten the integrity of the binational panel review process.\textsuperscript{83}

Although the strong language of this provision makes clear that the ECC process is not to function as a routine appeal, it must also be questioned whether the provision was intended to serve as no check whatsoever on panel decisions. To date, no ECC panel has found this standard satisfied. In some cases, the ECC has found various aspects of the standard met, but never the final aspect regarding a threat to the integrity of the process. For example, in \textit{Pure Magnesium from Canada}, the ECC found that the panel had “manifestly exceeded its powers by failing to apply the correct standard of review” and that this action “materially affected the Panel’s decision.”\textsuperscript{84} Nonetheless, the ECC concluded that this behavior did not threaten the integrity of the process because the panel’s decision was consistent with a decision of the U.S. Court of International Trade at the time, even though that decision was later overturned by the Federal Circuit.\textsuperscript{85}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{81} NAFTA Art. 1904(13).
\item \textsuperscript{82} NAFTA Art. 1904(13)(a)(iii).
\item \textsuperscript{83} NAFTA Art. 1904(13)(b).
\item \textsuperscript{85} \textit{Id.} at 9; \textit{see also} \textit{Gray Portland Cement and Clinker from Mexico}, ECC-2000-1904-01USA, Opinion and Order of the Extraordinary Challenge Committee at 6 (Oct. 30, 2003) (ECC (...continued)
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Notably, the ECC emphasized that NAFTA Article 1904(2) requires consideration of judicial precedents to the extent a reviewing court of the importing party would rely on such precedents and, as such, could not fault the panel for failing to apply U.S. law or for threatening the integrity of the process. The clear import of the ECC’s decision, however, suggests that were a panel to flagrantly disregard judicial precedents of the importing party, that action could lead to a finding of a threat to the integrity of the process. Such a finding surely would have been justified with respect to the Panel’s decision in the wire rod from Canada case.

C. **Procedural Pros and Cons of NAFTA Challenge**

In terms of procedures, a challenge before a binational panel has both pros and cons from the vantage of the domestic industry. On the plus side, domestic industries are given full rights of participation, may have access to confidential information under protective order, and may submit briefs and participate in the hearing. Hearings challenging U.S. decisions are generally held in Washington, D.C., so the venue is convenient. Where Commerce decisions are involved, attorneys from the Commerce Department present the arguments rather than Justice Department attorneys. Given the probing and detailed nature of many of the panelists’ questions at the often very long hearings, and the need for a high level of familiarity with the record, participation of Commerce attorneys who were involved in the agency proceeding and know the record well is generally a plus. Further, although NAFTA panels do not have equitable powers, suspension of liquidation of entries subject to a NAFTA challenge is possible in certain contexts based on a sustained Panel decision even though it noted that, in its view, the dissenting opinion reflected the “better-reasoned approach.”), *available at* http://www.worldtradelaw.net/naftaec/cement-dumping-naftaec.pdf.

86 Where decisions of the U.S. International Trade Commission are challenged, Commission attorneys defend those decisions before the WTO, the NAFTA panels, and the courts, so there is no difference in U.S. attorneys in ITC cases among the various trade fora.
request by an interested party to the administering authority pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(5)(C).

On the negative side, the NAFTA procedures for filing of various documents and processing basic papers, such as applications for protective orders, are often cumbersome. Numbers of copies required vary without particular reason, and a lack of electronic filing or electronic docket makes the process less user-friendly than the U.S. Court of International Trade. Often there is a significant delay in establishing a panel, which leads to motions languishing with no ruling for extended periods of time in some cases. No page limits are imposed on briefs and hearings often take many hours if not all day, as panelists ask a wide range of questions. Although this extensive process might be viewed as a plus by some, it also leads to forays by panelists into issues of only tangential importance to a case or long discussions of issues or laws that have no real bearing on the topic at issue, depending on the experience of each of the panelists and familiarity with the laws and facts of the case.

In terms of timing, the NAFTA system was intended to result in a speedier resolution of cases than the courts or the WTO. And, to a large extent, the deadlines established under NAFTA have led to fairly prompt submissions of pleadings, the record and briefs. Delays frequently occur, however, in the formation of the Panel, in the scheduling of the hearing, and in the issuance of the panel’s decision. In 2005, it was reported that:

NAFTA panel disputes now take on average 700 days to resolve (Lumber IV is in its fourth year). This is more than twice as long as they were supposed to, and longer than those settled at the U.S.

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88 Id. at 17 (Although Chapter 19 was “in theory, a good deal faster than WTO proceedings,” the process “has been seriously delayed in the last few years by failure to appoint panelists in a timely fashion.”).
Court of International Trade, the very process the NAFTA panels replaced.\textsuperscript{89}

It does not appear that this lag-time between filing of a NAFTA challenge and issuance of a decision has improved. In a recent case involving stainless steel sheet and strip from Mexico, the U.S. International Trade Commission issued its final decision in July 2005.\textsuperscript{90} ThyssenKrupp Mexinox filed a timely request for panel review in August 2005.\textsuperscript{91} While briefs were thereafter promptly filed by all parties in the first half of 2006, a significant delay occurred in constituting the panel. Once the panel was formed, a hearing was held in July 2007.\textsuperscript{92} The panel’s final decision was then issued in September 2008.\textsuperscript{93} While the panel’s decision sustained the Commission’s decision, thus affirming the status quo, a delay of over three years occurred between the filing of the panel request and issuance of the panel decision in this matter. Had a remand to the agency occurred, this matter would still be unresolved.

Thus, to the extent that speedy resolution of cases before NAFTA panels was an intended purpose of the binational panel process, that goal has not been accomplished.

D. \textbf{Substantive Results/Effect on U.S. Industry}

From the perspective of the domestic industry, the NAFTA binational review process is not a preferred choice of forum for trade litigation. As discussed above, parties in NAFTA


\textsuperscript{91} \textit{Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Mexico}, USA-MEX-2005-1904-06, Decision of the Panel (Sept. 10, 2008), supra note 62, at 4.

\textsuperscript{92} Id. at 5.

\textsuperscript{93} Id.
litigation face often cumbersome procedural hurdles and delays, incur significant costs in
addressing multiple issues in lengthy briefs and in participating in extensive hearings, and are
subject to a review process that often does not apply the proper standard of review. Even more
concerning than all of these factors, however, is the track record of the NAFTA binational panels
in trade remedy cases. Domestic industries, which are usually in the role of defending decisions
by the Commerce Department and the U.S. International Trade Commission in their favor, and
occasionally in the role of challenging those decisions themselves, simply do not fare well in
litigation before NAFTA panels as compared to litigation before U.S. courts.

It has long been recognized by most domestic industry trade practitioners that the
NAFTA binational review process is not the optimal forum for review of U.S. decisions to
impose antidumping or countervailing duties against imports from Canada or Mexico. This
perception appears to have a solid basis in fact. In a study issued this year comparing U.S.
judicial review and NAFTA panel review in trade remedy cases, the authors concluded:

A striking feature of the data analysed above is the sustained asymmetrical pattern of review results between NAFTA
and CIT/CAFC adjudication. Looking in different ways at the agency-determined rates prevailing before and after adjudication,
U.S. agencies consistently “lose” on NAFTA appeals at a greater rate than when those challenges are raised before U.S. courts.
Similar results would normally be interpreted as uncontroversial if they emanated from parallel review systems where the substantive
law or guiding principles of administrative review (or both) were different. That is not the case with review before NAFTA and the
CIT/CAFC systems.94

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Thus, statistically it has been the case that U.S. agencies more often lose in challenges brought before NAFTA panels than in judicial appeals. And because domestic industries are generally appearing before a NAFTA panel in support of an agency decision, they lose as well.

Moreover, when domestic industries have challenged U.S. agency decisions under the NAFTA Chapter 19 process (not generally because they chose to do so but because respondents opted for that forum), they have not been successful in overturning the agency. A study conducted of challenges by U.S. petitioners (as opposed to respondents) before NAFTA panels found that:

{I}n only three instances in Chapter 19’s history have U.S. petitioners persuaded a Chapter 19 panel that an agency has made any material error that the agency had not itself admitted. Another way of putting it is that of the more than eighty published Chapter 19 opinions reviewing U.S. agency action, totaling some 5000 pages, fewer than ten pages favorably dispose of petitioners’ claims against an agency.

... Overall, no petitioner has ever succeeded in having a U.S. agency determination overturned, even on a single claim, as a result of a Chapter 19 proceeding. This disparity is particularly noticeable with respect to injury determinations: NAFTA panels have forced three ITC decisions involving Canada to go from affirmative to negative since NAFTA’s inception, something that U.S. courts have done only once, even though orders involving Canada are only a small fraction of the ITC’s case load.\footnote{Juscelino F. Colares & John W. Bohn, \textit{NAFTA’s Double Standards of Review}, 42 Wake Forest L. Rev. 199, 212-214 (2007).}

Given these results, it is little wonder that domestic industries do not affirmatively seek NAFTA panel review instead of U.S. judicial review.

Where panelists have rejected a particular U.S. decision as lacking evidentiary support, the NAFTA decision is of concern to the parties to the case but not necessarily to the trade
community at large due to the lack of precedent these decisions are intended to have. More broadly, however, the lack of deference by panels generally to the U.S. agencies and the asymmetrical results are of concern to U.S. petitioners. Moreover, where NAFTA panels issue decisions on matters of law and do not respect the holdings of the U.S. appellate court, that is an even greater cause for concern. Trepidations that domestic industries may have had with NAFTA panel holdings in the past and the lack of deference to agency decision-making have only been heightened by the panel decision in the Canadian wire rod case.

IV. **LITIGATING BEFORE THE CIT AND FEDERAL CIRCUIT**

A. **Role of Petitioners/U.S. Industry**

The preferred forum for litigation by petitioners or U.S. industries is almost always the U.S. judicial system. The role of domestic industries in this process is significant. Where domestic industries seek to challenge an agency decision, they have full rights to file a cause of action, submit briefs and participate in oral argument before the Court. Where domestic industries seek to intervene in a court appeal to support an agency decision in their favor, again they have full rights equivalent to the rights of other parties.

B. **Standard of Review**

The standard of review applicable to litigation before the U.S. courts is also the most straight-forward and well-defined (as compared to WTO or NAFTA review standards). As recently articulated by the Court of International Trade,

> When reviewing the final results in antidumping administrative reviews, the Court will uphold Commerce's determination unless it is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. Section 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (2000).

Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” *Universal Camera Corp. v.*
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence “is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966) (citations omitted).


first looks at whether Congress has spoken directly to the issue and second, where Congressional intent is unclear, “the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute . . . rather . . . the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).96

Although this deferential standard of review is also to be applied by NAFTA panels, and a similar standard was to be applicable to WTO dispute settlement under Article 17.6(ii), the U.S. courts have generally exhibited a much greater willingness to defer to the U.S. agencies than either NAFTA panels or the WTO DSB. This deference may reflect not only a better understanding of the U.S. standard of review but also a recognition of the expertise the agencies bring to the process. As the Federal Circuit stated in describing the role of the International Trade Commission in Nippon Steel:

Commissioners are appointed by the President, and confirmed by the Senate, because of their expertise in recognizing, and distinguishing between, fair and unfair trade practices. They presumably are selected to be Commissioners based on their expertise in, inter alia, foreign relations, trade negotiations, and economics. Because of this expertise, Commissioners are the factfinders in the material injury determination: “It is the Commission's task to evaluate the evidence it collects during its

investigation. Certain decisions, such as the weight to be assigned a particular piece of evidence, lie at the core of that evaluative process.” U.S. Steel Group v. United States, 96 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1996).97

Based on this recognition, U.S. courts, and in particular the Federal Circuit, are significantly more willing to defer to agency decisions on issues involving substantial evidence challenges as well as on issues involving legal interpretations under Chevron as compared to other trade fora.

Where Federal Circuit review of a decision by the U.S. Court of International Trade is at issue, the appellate court has stated:

We apply anew the standard of review applied by the Court of International Trade in its review of the administrative record. We therefore uphold the Commission’s determination unless it was arbitrary and capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.98

Thus the U.S. appellate court essentially repeats the same review process under the same standard of review as the Court of International Trade – arguably, an inefficient process for appeal.

Another factor likely affecting the manner in which the standard of review is applied by U.S. courts, as opposed to NAFTA or WTO panels, is the different roles of U.S. judges and NAFTA/WTO panelists. Judges, with their unique background, training and experience, as well as their understanding of the rules of U.S. law, approach decision-making through a particular prism consistent with their experience as independent members of the U.S. judiciary. Panelists, on the other hand, not only lack the judicial training and background but often are practitioners serving as part-time adjudicators, with a bias toward certain legal interpretations or outcomes

97 Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
98 Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United States, 444 F.3d 1369, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
consistent with their backgrounds. NAFTA panelists, moreover, are not subject to any real appellate review, given the very high ECC standard. These fundamental differences in the nature of the decision-makers in the various trade fora undoubtedly account to a large extent for the different ways in which a seemingly similar, if not identical, standard of review is applied.

That U.S. courts generally understand and apply the standard of review properly, however, does not mean that in all cases judges do not substitute their own views or even create entirely new law, not found in the statute, based on their perceptions as to how the law should operate. In response to the appellate court’s decision in Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United States,99 for example, the Commission applied an entirely new “replacement/benefit” test that is not set forth in the statute and that, in fundamental terms, conflicts with other longstanding legal principles recognized by the court. This creation of an extra-statutory test could certainly be considered a failure to apply the law and the proper standard of review by the appellate court. Fortunately, a recent decision has significantly narrowed and limited the Bratsk holding, with the appellate court expressly stating that it did not intend to require the Commission to use a specific methodology or to apply an entirely new test. Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States, Appeal No. 2007-2552, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 19,774 at *23-30 (Sept. 18, 2008).

99 Bratsk Aluminum Smelter, 444 F.3d at 1375. As then-Commissioners Aranoff and Hillman stated, the Bratsk test “misconstrues the purpose of the statute, which is not to bar subject imports from the U.S. market . . . .” See Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Wire Rod from Trinidad & Tobago, Inv. No. 731-TA-961 (Final) (Remand), USITC Pub. 3903 at 16 (2007) (Final) (Remand), available at http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/pubs/701_731/pub3903.pdf. They further noted that, had the Commission applied “what we believe to be the proper standard” for injury determinations rather than the Bratsk-court’s replacement/benefit test, an affirmative determination would have resulted. Id. at 3.
C. **Procedural Pros and Cons of Court Litigation**

From the domestic industry’s vantage and, indeed, from most parties’ vantage, there are a number of positive procedural aspects to litigation before the courts as opposed to NAFTA or the WTO. Most importantly, U.S. law provides detailed rules and procedures to be followed, ranging from the extensive Federal Rules of Civil or Appellate Procedure to the specific rules applicable to litigation at the Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit. Although there are some general procedural rules and guidelines in both the WTO and NAFTA processes, neither comes close to the level of detail set forth in U.S. court rules and procedures. For example, if a motion were filed in an unassigned case before the Court of International Trade, a motions judge would rule on it rather than permitting it to languish as is often true in a NAFTA challenge. If a frivolous claim is filed by a party, an objection can be made under Rule 12(b)(6), an option not available in WTO or NAFTA challenges.

Other procedural approaches by the courts are also more beneficial to the parties than those existing in other fora. Applications for retaining confidential information under protective order before the court have been streamlined. Page limits are established for briefs, limiting parties from raising every issue possible. Time limits are generally imposed on oral arguments at the Court of International Trade of only an hour or two, requiring a focused discussion of the issues. Judges at the Court are also well prepared in advance of the argument, having read the briefs and knowing the law and the facts. In other fora, much time may be spent simply educating the panelists on these matters. In addition, questions about particular procedures, filing requirements or respective case status are readily available at the Federal Circuit and Court of International Trade via the Clerks’ offices as well as the assigning of individual case managers to each CIT judge. Further, the electronic nature of the CM-ECF process at the Court of
International Trade and the CAFC’s Electronic Pacer Docket are significantly more sophisticated and helpful to practitioners than the systems used by NAFTA or WTO panels.

On a more substantive level, the U.S. courts have powers in law and in equity, and thus are able to provide injunctive relief. Imposition of preliminary injunctions to maintain the status quo while litigation progresses may be an important factor in the ultimate remedy a party attains. Further, the remedies the court provides are not limited to prospective relief, but may be implemented retroactively with respect to entries that are unliquidated, depending on the facts, if the court finds it appropriate.

On the minus side, litigation before the courts can take a very long time, although there has been improvement in the timing of resolution of cases at the Court of International Trade in recent years. While the filing of pleadings and briefs generally tracks the deadlines set forth in the court rules, there may be a long delay before an oral argument is held and an even longer delay before a decision is issued. Further, because decisions often lead to one or more remands, these delays can diminish the effectiveness of any relief provided to the prevailing party. Statistics indicating the length of time for resolution of cases before the courts often fail to recognize the total time to conclude the litigation following multiple remands as opposed to simply the time to issue one decision.100

100 Between FY 1999 and FY 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reported a median time of 12.4 months to dispose of cases appealed from the U.S. Court of International Trade. See Federal Circuit, Median Time to Disposition in Cases Terminated After Hearing or Submission, available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/MedianDispTime(table)99-07.pdf.
In a recent case in which there was a six-year delay between the filing of the complaint and the latest ruling in plaintiffs’ favor, the Court stated that such a “timewarp” had occurred that the parties were instructed to attempt to settle the case given its “extraordinary procedural posture.” Another case involving a challenge to a U.S. International Trade Commission decision on grain-oriented electrical steel also spanned “more than six years and include[d] four determinations by the Commission and six opinions from the Court of International Trade” before it was resolved in 2007. Yet a third case involving an appeal from an International Trade Commission decision in an original investigation on wire rod has been before the courts (including twice before the Federal Circuit) for almost six years; indeed, the most recent argument before the Federal Circuit took place on the same day that the Commission issued its decision in the five-year “sunset” review of the order at issue.

Although each of these cases involved some complex issues, the lengthy time in which the appeals remain pending before the courts is of concern. These delays often deny parties the benefits of prevailing due to the extended passage of time. Further, costs to all parties are significant when the litigation is so protracted. Although litigation in other fora is subject to many negatives as discussed above, and can also be delayed in terms of ultimate decision and

101 Plaintiffs’ summons and complaint in CIT Court No. 01-00955 were filed on October 30, 2001. The most recent court decision was issued in November 2007. *Gerdau Ameristeel U.S., Inc. v. United States*, Slip Op. 07-165 (Nov. 8, 2007).

102 *Co-Steel Raritan, Inc. v. United States*, 31 CIT ___, 2007 Ct. Int’l Trade LEXIS 6 at *31-32 (Jan. 17, 2007). In that case, the Commission on remand was charged with reassessing a preliminary finding that certain imports would not imminently exceed the statutory negligibility standard. As the Court properly observed, “But this entails a perception of the future, which is now past.” *Co-Steel Raritan v. United States*, 29 CIT 562, 563 (2005)

103 *Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States*, 494 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

remedy, the one major drawback to judicial litigation remains the delay in final resolution of these appeals.

D. Substantive Results/Effect on U.S. Industries

When faced with a choice of fora, for the reasons noted above, domestic industries are best advised to pursue litigation before the U.S. courts when they have the opportunity to make that choice. Not only are the procedural facets of court appeals generally preferable for domestic litigants, but substantive aspects of this process are also positive. For example, there is the benefit of judicial precedent, with courts affirmatively acknowledging and citing decisions issued in the past on similar issues. Unlike NAFTA panels and the WTO, where decisions are not to be precedential, there is a value in having a wide and detailed body of precedential law to draw from in presenting cases to the courts.

Further, given that judges generally understand far better than panelists the standard of review applicable in U.S. law, judicial review of agency decisions best ensures that the standard will be properly applied. Although parties may disagree with the outcome, and believe that the standard was misapplied in some cases, overall it cannot be doubted that judges on both the Court of International Trade and Federal Circuit well understand *Chevron* and the standard of review set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b).

V. INTERPLAY OF CHALLENGES BEFORE VARIOUS FORA

A. Statutory Rules

The interrelationship of litigation that occurs before the various trade fora and the effects of decisions by one trade body on another have likely been more complex than was envisioned by Congress and the trade bar initially. Although certain statutory provisions are explicit in addressing how, if at all, a decision by one trade body will affect litigation on the same case or
other cases before other trade bodies, the cross-over effects of these decisions have been significant.

Two statutory provisions in U.S. law address the manner in which implementation of WTO decisions at odds with agency determinations can occur. Section 123(g) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”) provides that an agency practice or regulation that has been found by the WTO DSB to be WTO-inconsistent may not be modified until a number of procedural steps are taken by the Administration.\textsuperscript{105} These steps include consulting with various congressional committees, soliciting public comments on the proposed change and advice from private sector advisory committees, and generally participating in a 60-day consultation period.\textsuperscript{106} Section 129 of the URAA, on the other hand, addresses implementation of adverse WTO DSB decisions as they relate to specific antidumping or countervailing duty cases.\textsuperscript{107} Depending upon the WTO decision, implementation may require modification of an agency practice under section 123 as well as implementation of the determination in a specific case under section 129.

The Statement of Administrative Action explains the Administration’s intent with respect to section 129 as follows:

Subsection 129(e) amends section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930 to provide for review by the courts and NAFTA binational panels of new Title VII determinations made by Commerce or the ITC under section 129 that are implemented. The subsection also establishes the time available for filing an appeal with the court or with a binational panel. Section 129 determinations that are not implemented will not be subject to judicial or binational panel

\textsuperscript{105} 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g).
\textsuperscript{106} Id.
\textsuperscript{107} 19 U.S.C. § 3538.
review, because such determinations will not have any effect under domestic law.

In some cases, implementation of section 129 determinations may render moot all or some issues in pending litigation in connection with the agency’s initial determination. For example, should the Trade Representative direct Commerce to implement a section 129 determination that changes the cash deposit rate, such action could render moot any pending domestic litigation solely involving the amount of the cash deposit rate, as opposed to the validity of the underlying antidumping or countervailing duty order. If, by contrast, the litigation also involved the validity of the original determination, the court or binational panel would still have to render an opinion on that subject.

Since implemented determinations under section 129 may be appealed, it is possible that Commerce or the ITC may be in the position of simultaneously defending determinations in which the agency reached different conclusions. In such situations, the Administration expects that courts and binational panels will be sensitive to the fact that, under the applicable standard of review, as set forth in statute and case law, multiple permissible interpretations of the law and the facts may be legally permissible in any particular case, and the issuance of a different determination under section 129 does not signify that the initial determination was unlawful.108

As one commentator observed, “{it} was never seriously considered that a WTO dispute settlement decision would apply directly in U.S. law.”109 Further, under the URAA Supremacy Clause, Congress made clear that if there is an inconsistency between U.S. law and a provision in

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108 SAA at 1026-27.
the Uruguay Round international agreement, U.S. law takes precedence.\footnote{19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1).} Certainly, any dispute settlement finding that rejects a statute cannot be implemented except by legislation.

Where NAFTA binational panel decisions are at issue, the statute is more precise: U.S. courts may consider NAFTA decisions, although they are not binding.\footnote{19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(3).} As a practical matter, however, NAFTA decisions have not been particularly influential in judicial decisions. The lack of deference by the courts has been suggested to reflect the “arbitral nature of the proceedings and the lack of precedential effect” of those decisions, thus giving them but a limited role.\footnote{J. Restani & I. Bloom, Interpreting International Trade Statutes: Is the Charming Betsy Sinking?, 24 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1533, 1544 n.64 (2001).}

**B. Judicial Analysis of Relevance of NAFTA/WTO Decisions**

The interrelationship between the laws and decisions of the various international trade fora and the effects of a decision in one venue on another have been the subject of extensive analysis and discussion by U.S. courts and by commentators. Although it is recognized that U.S. courts must give effect to U.S. law when there is any conflict with an international agreement, where ambiguity in U.S. law exists or where the international ruling being considered is a decision handed down by the WTO dispute settlement body, the relationships are murkier.

In particular, courts have struggled with how the statutory requirements interface with the \textit{Charming Betsy} precept. Under the \textit{Charming Betsy} doctrine, “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains . . . “\footnote{Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).} The question remains, however, whether decisions of the WTO DSB comprise the “law of nations” for purposes of invoking \textit{Charming Betsy}. Although some commentators have argued
that WTO DSB decisions should be recognized under *Charming Betsy*, the Statement of Administrative Action accompanying the URRA states that decisions of WTO panels and the Appellate Body have no binding effect under U.S. law.\(^{114}\) Similarly, the U.S. courts have recognized that an interpretation of the international Antidumping Agreement by a WTO panel or Appellate Body has “no binding effect on the Court.”\(^{115}\)

In *Corus Staal*, the court rejected the suggestion that WTO DSB decisions should be given any legal effect outside of the WTO: “While commentators argue that there is de facto *stare decisis* within the WTO . . . the fact remains that these decisions have no express legal effect beyond the boundaries of the particular {WTO} case.”\(^{116}\) Similarly, in *Tembec, Inc. v. United States*, a three-judge panel of the Court of International Trade recognized that under the WTO, the United States is free to disregard decisions by a WTO panel or Appellate Body.\(^{117}\) Specifically, *Tembec* recognized that under the international agreements, while compliance with a WTO DSB decision is encouraged, parties are expressly given the right to substitute a compensatory trade agreement or accept retaliation while leaving the practice in place.\(^{118}\) Although the WTO Appellate Body has now indicated that it expects its decisions to have precedential effect for future WTO DSB reviews (*see* section II.D, *supra*), in fact WTO

\(^{114}\) H.R. Doc. No. 103-316 at 1032 (1994).


\(^{117}\) 441 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1328 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006).

\(^{118}\) *Id.*
decisions were never intended to have *stare decisis* effect and are simply decisions that a member country may choose to, but need not, implement.119

On the other hand, in *SNR Roulements*, the court reiterated the importance of interpreting U.S. law so as not to conflict with international obligations, although it did not expressly address the question of whether WTO DSB decisions comprised international obligations.120 Similarly, the *Usinor* court held that despite the absence of *stare decisis* on WTO decisions, they may still be a source of “persuasive rationale.”121 Most notably, the *Allegheny Ludlum* court found that its decision to adopt a narrow interpretation of the statute avoided an “unnecessary conflict between domestic law” and the WTO agreement, citing the *Charming Betsy* doctrine in support of its conclusion.122

C. **Three Case Studies**

Three cases provide interesting examples of the intersection between the various international trade fora: the zeroing cases, the privatization appeals, and the lumber litigation addressing the ITC threat decision.

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119 *Corus Staal BV*, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1264 (Ct. Intl Trade 2003) (“WTO decisions appear to have very limited precedential value and are binding only upon the particular countries involved. They are not binding upon other signatory countries or future WTO panels”); see also J. Greenwald, *After Corus Staal—Is There Any Role, and Should There Be—For WTO Jurisprudence in the Review of U.S. Trade Measures by U.S. Courts?*, 39 Geo. J. Int’l L. 199, 207-209 (2007). Indeed, the author questions whether a U.S. court should ever pay any attention to WTO decisions or accord them weight, given the limited legal status of these decisions in U.S. law. *Id.* at 208.


122 *Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States*, 367 F.3d 1339, 1345, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
With respect to zeroing, in the *Bed Linens from India* case, the WTO Appellate Body first held that the practice of zeroing was not consistent with the international Antidumping Agreement.\(^{123}\) In reviewing the relevance, if any, of this holding to its determination of whether the U.S. zeroing practice was lawful, the Federal Circuit in *Timken* found the practice to be reasonable regardless of the WTO decision.\(^{124}\) Rather than finding that the WTO holding was simply irrelevant to its decision as a WTO DSB holding, however, the Federal Circuit found that the decision was distinguishable because it did not address the U.S. zeroing practice and applied in the context of an investigation not an administrative review.\(^{125}\) In *Corus Staal*, the court also reviewed the zeroing methodology and the *Bed Linens* holding, and found that the WTO Appellate Body decision was a “non-binding interpretation of an international agreement” and that even if the domestic statute is ambiguous, the court should defer to the domestic interpretation in the face of ambiguities.\(^{126}\)

Subsequently, however, there were a number of WTO DSB decisions that explicitly struck down the U.S. practice of zeroing in all contexts. In April 2006, the WTO Appellate Body found that the zeroing methodology applied by the United States in administrative reviews was inconsistent with WTO obligations.\(^{127}\) In *United States--Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews*, the Appellate Body found zeroing inconsistent with various Articles of the AD

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\(^{124}\) *Timken Co. v. United States*, 354 F.3d 1334, 1342-45 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

\(^{125}\) Id. at 1343-45.

\(^{126}\) *Corus Staal BV v. United States Dep’t of Commerce*, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1263-64 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2003), aff’d upon remand, 395 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

Agreement. Finally, the Appellate Body recently reversed the Panel’s determination that the U.S. zeroing practice in administrative reviews was allowed under WTO rules.

The Federal Circuit, however, did not alter its determination that the practice of zeroing was lawful under the U.S. statute irrespective of express WTO holdings to the contrary. Indeed, the court has made increasingly clear in its decisions that the holdings of the WTO DSBody are not binding on nor even particularly relevant to its analysis and decision.

The zeroing issue has also arisen in NAFTA binational panel reviews. In the wire rod from Canada case discussed in sections III.B.1 and III.D above, the NAFTA panel concluded in reviewing the U.S. practice of zeroing that it need not follow Federal Circuit decisions addressing this exact issue and sustaining the Commerce Department’s zeroing methodology. While ignoring U.S. appellate court law, the NAFTA panel cited to and relied upon the reasoning in several WTO DSBody decisions that struck down the U.S. zeroing methodology. Ignoring the holding of the U.S. appellate courts while citing and following decisions by the WTO DSBody is a disturbing development, to say the least, from the vantage of the domestic industry.

Unfortunately, despite consistent decisions by the U.S. appellate court sustaining the Commerce Department’s zeroing methodology, the U.S. administration determined that it would

130 See SKF USA, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.3d 1373 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 18,159 at *21-22 (Fed. Cir. 2008); NSK Ltd. v. United States, 510 F.3d 1375, 1379-1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
131 SKF USA, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 18,159 at *22; NSK Ltd., 510 F.3d at 1380.
133 Id. at 36.
eliminate its longstanding practice of zeroing to comply with the WTO Appellate Body decision. As Congressman Rangel observed:

That practice {zeroing} had been in place for more than eighty years in the United States and many other countries. The administration ended this practice to comply with a WTO ruling that the administration itself described as “very troubling,” “fatally flawed,” and “devoid of legal merit.”

Thus, despite the U.S. courts’ consistent affirrnance of the zeroing practice as lawful, that practice has been abrogated based on rejection by the WTO DSB – a major loss for U.S. petitioners.

In the steel privatization appeals, challenges were advanced before the WTO to the change-in-ownership methodology applied by the Commerce Department. The WTO Panel found that the U.S. practice as well as the U.S. statutory provision in section 771(5)(F) addressing change-in-ownership violated the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.

In response to arguments by the United States that the statute did not require the change-in-ownership methodology it adopted, the WTO Appellate Body found that section 771(F)(5) “as

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134 Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margin During an Antidumping Investigation, 71 Fed. Reg. 11,189 (Dep’t Commerce Mar. 6, 2006).


137 Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from European Communities, WT/DS 212/R (July 31, 2002).
such” did not require use of this methodology. The Appellate Body concluded that while the U.S. methodology violated international obligations, the U.S. statute on its face was not unlawful. In response to this decision, the United States conducted proceedings under section 123 and section 129 and adopted a new and, from the domestic industry’s perspective, unlawful and unhelpful change-in-ownership test, designed to reflect the Appellate Body holding. See section II.C, supra.

In an appeal that occurred on privatization after the WTO Appellate Body decision was issued, the Federal Circuit noted that the WTO DSB decision was not binding on the court, but nonetheless cited to and relied upon the Appellate Body’s holding to harmonize what it characterized as an ambiguous U.S. statute with the “international obligations” of the United States. As one commentator recognized,

> While vociferously declaring that WTO Appellate Body decisions are not binding on United States courts, the Federal Circuit and the CIT are quietly giving those same decisions acknowledged deference in their determinations of law. In a contrary vein, the courts avoid mentioning the URAA Supremacy Clause, which is binding on the courts, while using WTO Appellate Body decisions to harmonize the statutory interpretations and WTO agreements in question.

Perhaps, the most interesting interplay between a NAFTA decision and a WTO decision occurred in the challenge to the International Trade Commission’s decision in the softwood lumber from Canada case. As discussed above, the NAFTA binational panel found that there

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139 Id.
140 Allegheny Ludlum Corp v. United States, 367 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
was no record evidence to support the Commission’s threat of injury finding and ordered the Commission to issue a determination “that the evidence on the record does not support a finding of threat of material injury . . . .”142 Pursuant to the Panel’s order, and despite expressing strong disagreement with the Panel’s view and its ordered result, the Commission issued a negative determination.143

At the same time, however, Canada had also filed a challenge to the Commission’s injury determination before the WTO DSB. The WTO DSB, although questioning some aspects of the Commission’s decision, did not direct that it be overturned. On remand by the WTO, the Commission issued an affirmative threat finding yet again.144 The ITC’s negative determination in response to the NAFTA panel occurred in September 2004, while the ITC’s affirmative determination in response to the WTO decision was issued in November 2004. Ultimately, the WTO sustained the new ITC affirmative ruling. The United States then took the position that the WTO decision essentially prevailed over the NAFTA ruling and did not revoke the lumber order at issue.

As a result, at least one commentator has questioned the value of using a dual-venue challenge to an antidumping decision, citing the outcome in the lumber case:

Ironically, the Canadian decision to follow a two-track strategy of appealing the initial ITC determination to both the WTO and a Chapter 19 panel has – at the end of the day – seemed to have backfired. After all, if the ITC decision had only been challenged pursuant to NAFTA Chapter 19, there would be no

basis for imposing duties since the ITC’s negative injury
determination would be the last word.\textsuperscript{145}

D. Other Considerations in Choice of Trade Fora

The different natures of the challenges presented in a WTO, NAFTA or court appeal may in themselves lead to different results and, thus, affect the choice of fora. In a NAFTA Chapter 19 challenge and in a U.S. court appeal, the issue is whether the agency decision is in accordance with applicable U.S. law. In a WTO appeal, however, the issue is whether the agency decision, policy or law is in accordance with the WTO international agreements. Based on these different questions, it is certainly plausible that different results may ensue.

Further, it is not the case that the NAFTA Chapter 19 process and the WTO DSB process are alternative options to challenging agency actions. Both NAFTA and WTO venues may be and often are pursued. Similarly, parties may pursue an appeal before the U.S. courts at the same time they are pursuing a WTO DSB challenge. Although these challenges could potentially reflect the presentation of issues based on domestic law as opposed to international law, in fact most of the challenges presented in the various trade fora reflect largely the same issues.\textsuperscript{146}

The reasons why a party may choose to pursue simultaneous challenges before more than one forum vary. As noted above, only Member nations may bring actions before the WTO. If private litigants wish to directly challenge agency action, they must pursue a NAFTA or court

\textsuperscript{146} For example, the Korean Government and Korean producer Hynix challenged both the Commerce Department’s finding of subsidies and the Commission’s injury determination involving DRAMs from Korea. Both the WTO DSB and the U.S. court sustained the affirmative finding by Commerce and the Commission. See Appellate Body Report, \textit{United States – Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMs) from Korea}, WT/DS 296/AB/R (June 27, 2005); \textit{Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. United States}, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006); \textit{Hynix Semiconductor v. United States}, 425 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006). Further, the issues raised at the WTO and the courts were largely the same. Thus, the costs and resources of pursuing dual venues were significantly higher with no ultimate difference in result.
Although respondent parties may attempt to persuade foreign governments to pursue a WTO challenge on their behalf, that course of action does not preclude them from also pursuing a NAFTA challenge. As a practical matter, pursuit of remedies in more than one forum may lead to a quicker remedy, depending on the forum. Further, by using more than one forum, respondents may obtain an additional bite at the apple. Even if a U.S. court sustains the agency’s decision, if a WTO panel rejects that decision, the United States must still implement the WTO DSB decision or accept retaliation. On the other hand, as the Canadian lumber industry discovered, pursuit of relief before both NAFTA and the WTO may backfire. See section V.C., supra.

Moreover, because the WTO DSB has no equitable remedies available to it, respondents may opt to pursue both an appeal before a U.S. court as well as a challenge at the WTO. By appealing a decision to a U.S. court, respondents are able to obtain a preliminary injunction preventing liquidation of entries. Even though they may ultimately lose their U.S. appeal, by delaying liquidation of the entries, if they succeed in their WTO challenge, the relief provided may in fact have broader effect and apply as well to the unliquidated entries. Indeed, it appears that the continued court appeals challenging the Commerce Department’s zeroing methodology, despite the appellate court’s strong and repeated findings in favor of the agency on the zeroing

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147 Although petitioners do not have a choice of fora between the WTO and NAFTA/U.S. courts, respondents may opt to pursue a NAFTA challenge and/or court appeal in addition to a WTO appeal to preserve their right to present their own arguments rather than having to defer to the foreign government as to which arguments it will pursue. See Macrory, supra note 84, at 16. Respondents also may opt to pursue WTO litigation in some cases because they can file the challenge simply in reaction to a particular policy, without respect to implementation of that policy in a specific case as is required for a NAFTA challenge or court appeal. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies, adopted Aug. 23, 2001, WT/DS194/R (Jun. 27, 2005).
issue, are simply a means of obtaining this injunctive relief while respondents simultaneously pursue a WTO challenge on zeroing.\textsuperscript{148}

VI. CONCLUSION

From the perspective of domestic industry petitioners, therefore, there is little “choice” in the trade venue to pursue but much consequence to the venue chosen by respondents. Domestic petitioners will and should pursue litigation before the U.S. courts in virtually all instances when challenging a U.S. agency decision in an antidumping or countervailing duty case. Pursuit of litigation before the U.S. courts provides the most optimal procedures, precedent, and proper application of the standard of review as compared to WTO DSB or NAFTA binational panel review. On the other hand, when respondents opt for challenges in other venues, the domestic industry is well-advised to participate in the proceeding as actively as possible to protect its interests, as its interests will not always align with those of the U.S. government. Close coordination with government counsel in respondent challenges before the WTO and NAFTA panels will best ensure the strongest presentation of arguments in the U.S. industry’s favor.

\textsuperscript{148} See, e.g., SKF USA, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.3d 1373, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 18,159 at *21-22 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“We have reviewed SKF’s arguments regarding zeroing and find them unpersuasive. SKF fails to raise any argument not fully resolved by our established precedent . . . Accordingly, we need not revisit this issue today.”).

*This is a draft of an article that is forthcoming in 17 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. (2009). Reprinted with the permission of the Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law.