Protecting the Right to Judicial Review in Trade Remedy Cases: Preliminary Injunctions and the Impact of Recent Court Decisions*

by Jeffrey D. Gerrish and Luke A. Meisner

I. Introduction

In an appeal of an antidumping (“AD”) or countervailing duty (“CVD”) determination, the issuance of a preliminary injunction is essential to ensure that the plaintiff is not deprived of a remedy with respect to the particular entries of foreign merchandise affected by its appeal and, more generally, its right to judicial review. Several recent decisions by the U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”) and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) have served to preserve and enhance the protection offered by preliminary injunctions in appeals from AD/CVD determinations. While these recent decisions have contributed to the ability of parties to preserve their rights to judicial review and effective relief from erroneous AD/CVD determinations, they do not by any means guarantee that parties’ rights will be preserved in all cases. Thus, as at least one judge of the CIT has recognized, a carefully crafted legislative fix may be necessary to protect the rights of all parties challenging AD/CVD determinations and to ensure that such parties have their day in court.

II. The Importance of Preliminary Injunctions in Appeals of AD/CVD Determinations

Trade remedy proceedings in the United States are conducted by the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) and the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”). In such proceedings, the agencies determine (i) whether AD/CVD duties should be applied to imports of foreign merchandise into the United States and (ii) if so, the proper amount of duties that should

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be applied.\(^2\) If Commerce determines that the merchandise in question is being sold at “less than its fair value” (i.e., is being dumped) or has benefited from countervailable subsidies, and if the ITC finds that imports of such merchandise are injuring or threatening to injure a domestic industry, Commerce is required to issue an AD/CVD order imposing additional duties on the merchandise.\(^3\) When the foreign merchandise is thereafter imported into the United States, the importer must deposit estimated AD/CVD duties with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) for each entry of merchandise.\(^4\) That deposit is made pending liquidation, which is the final computation or assessment of duties for a particular entry of merchandise.\(^5\) Entries of merchandise are liquidated, and final duties are paid, at the AD/CVD rate set forth in liquidation instructions issued by Commerce to Customs.

Parties to an AD/CVD proceeding have a statutory right to appeal a determination issued by Commerce or the ITC to the CIT.\(^6\) If the CIT finds on appeal that the determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is not in accordance with law, it may remand the matter to the agency for disposition consistent with its findings.\(^7\) In turn, this could result in a change to the AD/CVD duties that are ultimately applied to the entries of foreign merchandise at issue in the appeal when such entries are liquidated. To prevent the entries of foreign merchandise from

\(^2\) See generally Mukand Int'l, Ltd. v. United States, 502 F.3d 1366, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("Mukand II") (describing the system pursuant to which the U.S. trade remedy laws operate).

\(^3\) See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1677b. Imposition of an AD/CVD order may also be warranted where the ITC finds that the establishment of a domestic industry is being materially retarded by imports of foreign merchandise. See id.; see also Mukand II, 502 F.3d at 1367.

\(^4\) 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1677b; see also Mukand II, 502 F.3d at 1367.

\(^5\) See 19 C.F.R. §§ 141.101, 141.103, 159.1.

\(^6\) 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a).

\(^7\) Id. § 1516a(c)(3).
being prematurely liquidated while the appeal is still pending before the CIT, the statute authorizes the CIT to enjoin liquidation of the entries.8

The CIT rules specifically provide for parties to an appeal of an AD/CVD determination to file a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin liquidation of the entries subject to the appeal.9 However, it is essential for a party challenging an AD/CVD determination to obtain such a preliminary injunction before the entries are liquidated. Once entries are liquidated, such liquidations become “final and conclusive upon all persons (including the United States and any officer thereof).”10 In other words, once entries have been liquidated by Customs, they generally cannot be reliquidated at a different AD/CVD duty rate – even by order of the CIT.11 Moreover, as the Federal Circuit has recognized, once the entries subject to an appeal have been liquidated, the CIT is deprived of jurisdiction to review the challenged AD/CVD determination as any question relating to the amount of duties to be applied to those entries is rendered moot by the liquidation.12 On the other hand, if the CIT does issue an injunction enjoining liquidation of the subject entries prior to their actually being liquidated, liquidation generally may only be at the

8  Id. § 1516a(c)(2).
9  Rule 56.2 of the United States Court of International Trade.
11  Id.; see also SKF USA, Inc. v. United States, 512 F.3d 1326, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Under our case law, once liquidation occurs the trial court is powerless to order the assessment of duties at any different rate.”). There are some limited exceptions to the rule against reliquidation of entries. For example, in Shinyei Corp. of America v. United States, the Federal Circuit held that in an action challenging liquidation instructions under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the CIT could, under certain circumstances, use its equitable powers to compel reliquidation of entries if a preliminary injunction has been sought and denied. 355 F.3d 1297, 1305, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
rate that is ultimately approved by the court. As the CIT has stated, “to permit liquidation at any other rate violates the clear mandate of the unfair trade laws, not to mention the final judgment of the court entered in the cases in which injunctions were issued.” Thus, if a party aggrieved by an erroneous AD/CVD determination wants to receive the benefit of a favorable court decision in its appeal, it is essential that the party obtain a preliminary injunction before liquidation takes place.

Significantly, it is equally important for both U.S. producers (i.e., petitioners) and the producers, exporters, and importers of foreign merchandise (i.e., respondents) in trade remedy cases to obtain preliminary injunctions in a timely manner. From the respondent’s perspective, a preliminary injunction is a respondent’s only assurance that it will receive any refunds of the deposits of AD/CVD duties it has made if the CIT rules in its favor. From the petitioner’s perspective, it is important to ensure that entries of foreign merchandise are liquidated in accordance with the final decision of the CIT, as only the correct assessment of AD/CVD duties ensures a level playing field for U.S. producers competing with dumped and subsidized imports.

III. Recent Court Decisions Have Preserved and Enhanced the Protection Offered by Preliminary Injunctions

In several recent cases, the CIT and Federal Circuit were faced with issues that threatened to undermine the ability of parties challenging AD/CVD determinations to protect their rights to

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14 Id.
judicial review and effective relief through the issuance of a preliminary injunction. In their
decisions in these cases, the CIT and Federal Circuit have recognized the fundamental need to
protect parties' rights and have acted to do so.

A. Five-Day Grace Period and Requirement of Personal Service

Preliminary injunctions in AD/CVD cases at the CIT normally contain two special
provisions not found in injunctions issued in other types of cases: (i) a requirement that the
preliminary injunction be personally served on certain Commerce and Customs officials and (ii)
a provision stating that the preliminary injunction will only take effect five days after it has been
personally served on the relevant officials. In recent decisions, the CIT and Federal Circuit have
rejected efforts by the government to rely on these provisions as a basis for the dismissal of
AD/CVD appeals where the entries of foreign merchandise at issue in the appeals had been
liquidated.

1. The Five-Day Grace Period

One such decision is the decision in Agro Dutch Ind. Ltd. v. United States (“Agro
Dutch”). The issue in Agro Dutch was the meaning and effect to be given to the provision in a
preliminary injunction stating that the injunction would only take effect five days after it was
personally served on certain Commerce and Customs officials. As is its practice, the
government had requested that this five-day grace period be included as a condition of its
consenting to the entry of a preliminary injunction so that it would avoid “an inadvertent
violation” of the injunction. The plaintiff, a respondent in the underlying AD proceeding,

17 589 F.3d 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
18 Id. at 1189.
19 Id.
served the preliminary injunction on the appropriate government officials three days after it was 
issued by the CIT.\textsuperscript{20} However, Customs liquidated nearly all of the entries that were subject to 
the appeal on the very same day that the respondent served the injunction.\textsuperscript{21} After extensive 
additional proceedings, the CIT remanded the matter to Commerce for a redetermination of the 
AD duty rate calculated for the respondent, and Commerce issued a redetermination on remand 
that significantly lowered that rate.\textsuperscript{22} The respondent then moved to have the CIT amend the 
effective date of the preliminary injunction to the date that it was issued and direct that the 
relevant entries be reliquidated at the lower duty rate calculated by Commerce in the remand 
redetermination.\textsuperscript{23} The government, on the other hand, argued that the CIT lacked jurisdiction to 
entertain the respondent’s appeal regarding the entries that had been liquidated.\textsuperscript{24} To ensure that 
its decision on the merits of the case had effect, the CIT granted the respondent’s motion.\textsuperscript{25}

The government appealed the CIT’s decision, arguing that the CIT lacked jurisdiction 
over the liquidated entries and was therefore powerless to amend the injunction or order 
reliquidation.\textsuperscript{26} The Federal Circuit, however, affirmed the CIT’s decision.\textsuperscript{27} It found that the 
purpose of the preliminary injunction and the understanding and intent of all the parties was to

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Id. at 1190.}
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Id. at 1192.}
suspend liquidation pending a decision on the merits of the plaintiff’s challenge.\textsuperscript{28} Moreover, it found that the purpose of adding the five-day grace period to the injunction was “to ensure against subjecting Customs officials to contempt sanctions for an inadvertent liquidation.”\textsuperscript{29} It was “not intended to give the government free rein to liquidate the subject entries before the injunction took effect.”\textsuperscript{30} The Federal Circuit also rejected the government’s argument that the interest in the finality of AD duties imposed by the government mandated that the CIT’s decision be overturned. It found that, “\{w\}hile finality is an important goal, the interest in finality must give way in the face of a more compelling interest in this case: namely, effecting the intent of the parties and the court to prevent a premature liquidation while judicial review is ongoing.”\textsuperscript{31}

2. \textit{The Personal Service Requirement}

Subsequently, in \textit{Clearon Corp. v. United States} (“\textit{Clearon}”), the CIT extended the Federal Circuit’s holding in \textit{Agro Dutch} to language in a preliminary injunction that required the injunction to be personally served on certain Commerce and Customs officials.\textsuperscript{32} In \textit{Clearon}, Commerce published the final results of an AD administrative review, which resulted in the lifting of the statutory suspension of liquidation that had been in effect during the course of the administrative review.\textsuperscript{33} This lifting of the suspension of liquidation also started the six-month

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\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Id.}
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\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Id.} at 1193.
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\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Id.}
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\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Id.}
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\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Id.} at 3-4, 2010 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 89 at *3.
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period for so-called “deemed liquidation.”34 Specifically, pursuant to the statute, when the suspension of liquidation of entries is removed, Customs must liquidate the entries within six months after receiving notice of the removal.35 Any entry not liquidated by Customs within six months after receiving such notice is deemed liquidated by operation of law at the rate of duty asserted at the time of entry by the importer of record.36

The U.S. producers challenged Commerce’s final results before the CIT and, with the consent of the government, sought a preliminary injunction against liquidation.37 The CIT granted the injunction, which included language stating that the injunction would take effect five days after it was personally served by the U.S. producers’ counsel on certain individuals at Commerce and Customs.38 The case then proceeded “in the usual fashion” until, over a year after the CIT had granted the injunction, the government filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the CIT no longer had jurisdiction over the appeal.39 According to the government, the U.S. producers had failed to personally serve the injunction on the relevant Commerce and Customs officials and, as a result, the injunction had failed to prevent a deemed liquidation of the entries of merchandise subject to the appeal.40

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34 Id. at 2-3, 2010 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 89 at *2.
36 Id.
38 Id.
The CIT denied the government’s motion to dismiss.\(^{41}\) As an initial matter, it recognized that in ordinary litigation it is the duty of the lawyer for the party being enjoined – and not the lawyer for the party seeking an injunction – to inform those who might violate the injunction of its existence.\(^{42}\) It further recognized that although it had become common in the CIT for a consent injunction to contain language requiring the party that obtained the injunction to serve it personally on certain officials at Commerce and Customs, the purpose of this language was simply “to reduce the chance of these entities taking action to liquidate the subject merchandise.”\(^{43}\) Given this purpose of the service requirement, the CIT found that the Federal Circuit’s holding in *Agro Dutch* required that it “give meaning to the parties’ primary intention that no liquidation should take place.”\(^{44}\) Accordingly, the CIT used its equitable powers to disregard the service requirement in the preliminary injunction and to order that the entries were not to be deemed liquidated.\(^{45}\)

It should be noted that the holding in *Clearon* is in conflict with another recent decision by the CIT – *i.e.*, *Ames True Temper v. United States* (“*Ames True Temper*”).\(^{46}\) In *Ames True Temper*, the CIT dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the respondent had failed to


\(^{42}\) Slip Op. 2010-86 at 11-12, 2010 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 89 at *13-*14; see also *Anthony Marano Co. v. MS-Grand Bridgeview, Inc.*, No. 08 C 4244, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56280, 2009 WL 1904403, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2009) (holding that the enjoined party, whose employees violated a preliminary injunction, could not claim that the “notice of the injunction 'was not fully transmitted' to all of [its employees]” when its counsel has been notified of the injunction).


\(^{45}\) *Id.*

serve the preliminary injunction on the appropriate Commerce and Customs officials and the entries subject to the appeal had been deemed liquidated.\footnote{Id.} The respondent in that case had filed a consent motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the liquidation of entries that were the subject of its appeal of an administrative review of an AD order.\footnote{Slip Op. 2010-33 at 2-3, 2010 Ct. Intl. Trade Lexis at *2-*3} The CIT issued the injunction which (as usual) included language stating that it would only take effect after it was personally served on certain Commerce and Customs officials.\footnote{Slip Op. 2010-33 at 3, 2010 Ct. Intl. Trade Lexis at *3} The respondents did not serve the injunction until eight months after the final results of the administrative review had been published (and thus two months after the expiration of the six-month period for deemed liquidation).\footnote{Slip Op. 2010-33 at 3, 2010 Ct. Intl. Trade Lexis at *3-*4.} The CIT dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that the preliminary injunction was ineffective in preventing deemed liquidation because it was not properly served.\footnote{Slip Op. 2010-33 at 3-4, 2010 Ct. Intl. Trade Lexis at *3-*4.}

Significantly, the rate at which the entries were deemed liquidated in \textit{Ames True Tempter} was lower than the rate the respondent had received in the final results of the administrative review that was being appealed.\footnote{Slip Op. 2010-33 at 3-4, 2010 Ct. Intl. Trade Lexis at *3-*4. (citing \textit{Shandong Huarong Mach. Co., Ltd. v. United States}, Court No. 06-345, Slip Op. 08-135, 2008 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 129 at *5 (Dec. 10, 2005)).} Thus, it was the U.S. producer, rather than the respondent, that was harmed by the deemed liquidation. The U.S. producer subsequently filed a separate appeal before the CIT seeking reliquidation of the entries in question in accordance with the final

\footnote{Id.}
results issued by Commerce.\textsuperscript{53} The U.S. producer argued that, under \textit{Agro Dutch}, the CIT was required to give effect to the preliminary injunction even though it had not been personally served on the appropriate Commerce and Customs officials.\textsuperscript{54} However, the CIT dismissed the U.S. producer’s appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In so doing, it found that the Federal Circuit’s decision in \textit{Agro Dutch} was distinguishable from the U.S. producer’s challenge, even though both cases involved the special service requirements for preliminary injunctions in AD/CVD appeals.\textsuperscript{55} It explained that \textit{Agro Dutch} involved Customs affirmatively liquidating the subject entries the day the preliminary injunction was served whereas the appeal in \textit{Ames True Temper} involved the deemed liquidation of entries months after the issuance of the injunction.\textsuperscript{56} In other words, the CIT found that while \textit{Agro Dutch} may require the court to disregard the service requirement where entries are actually liquidated after the CIT has issued an injunction, \textit{Agro Dutch} did not require the court to disregard the service requirement where the entries were deemed liquidated after the CIT had issued an injunction.

\textbf{B. Fifteen-Day Policy}

The CIT has also recently addressed a policy imposed by Commerce that presents perhaps the most significant obstacle to parties’ ability to secure preliminary injunctions prior to the liquidation of entries and thereby preserve their rights to judicial review and effective relief from erroneous AD/CVD determinations. The policy in question is Commerce’s fifteen-day policy.

In the fifteen-day policy originally established by Commerce in August 2002, Commerce stated that it would issue liquidation instructions to Customs within fifteen days of the publication of the final results in an administrative review of an AD/CVD order.57 Commerce subsequently revised the fifteen-day policy to state that it would issue liquidation instructions fifteen days after publication of its final results in an administrative review.58

Under either formulation, Commerce’s fifteen-day policy wreaks havoc with the scheme that has been established for appealing AD/CVD determinations and seeking preliminary injunctions in such appeals. Pursuant to the statute, an interested party may challenge a final AD/CVD determination by filing a summons within thirty days of the date of publication of the final results in the Federal Register and by filing a complaint within thirty days thereafter.59 Moreover, pursuant to the rules of the CIT, parties have thirty days after service of the complaint to file a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin liquidation of the entries subject to appeal.60 Thus, either version of Commerce’s fifteen-day policy significantly increases the risk

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57 See, e.g., Mittal Steel Galati S.A. v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1313 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007). Commerce announced its fifteen-day policy by publishing the policy on its website. The announcement on Commerce’s website stated:

The Department of Commerce announces that, effective immediately, it intends to issue liquidation instructions pursuant to administrative reviews conducted under section 751 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, to the U.S. Customs Service within 15 days of publication of the final results of review in the Federal Register or any amendments thereto. This announcement applies to reviews conducted under sections 751(a)(1) and (2) of the Tariff Act.


60 Rule 56.2 of the United States Court of International Trade.
that entries will be liquidated before the deadline for parties to appeal and apply for a preliminary injunction.

In fact, there have been numerous instances where Commerce’s application of its fifteen-day policy has resulted in the liquidation of entries prior to parties obtaining a preliminary injunction from the CIT, thus depriving the parties of a remedy with respect to the particular entries affected by their appeal and, more generally, depriving them of their right to judicial review. For example, in *Mukand Int’l Ltd. v. United States* ("Mukand"), Commerce issued liquidation instructions to Customs before the respondent had filed a complaint or a request for a preliminary injunction at the CIT.\(^{61}\) The subject entries were liquidated 75 days after the AD/CVD determination had been published in the Federal Register, which was after the respondent had filed its complaint but before it filed a motion for a preliminary injunction.\(^{62}\) Similarly, in *Mittal Steel Galati S.A. v. United States* ("Mittal"), Commerce issued liquidation instructions before the respondent had even filed a complaint and a number of the respondent’s entries were liquidated while it was in the midst of negotiations with the government over a consent motion for a preliminary injunction.\(^{63}\) In both of these cases, the CIT found that the statute does not explicitly state how or when Commerce should transmit liquidation instructions to Customs and that Commerce’s fifteen-day policy was a reasonable method of filling this “statutory gap.”\(^{64}\) Accordingly, the CIT concluded in both *Mukand* and *Mittal* that the entries in

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\(^{62}\) Id. at 1310.


\(^{64}\) *Mukand*, 30 C.I.T. at 1314; *Mittal*, 31 C.I.T. at 1145.
question had been properly liquidated and that, as a result, the respondents’ challenges to
Commerce’s AD/CVD determinations must be dismissed.65

In a departure from the holdings of Mukand and Mittal, however, the CIT has recently
issued a series of decisions holding that Commerce’s fifteen-day policy is not in accordance with
law.66 First, in SKF USA Inc. v. United States (“SKF I”), the plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment that Commerce’s original fifteen-day policy was unlawful on the ground that the
statutory provisions governing the time for filing an appeal of an AD/CVD determination require
Commerce to wait sixty days or more before issuing liquidation instructions to Customs.67 The
CIT disagreed with the plaintiff’s specific argument, finding that the statute does not require
Commerce to wait sixty days before issuing liquidation instructions.68 Nevertheless, the CIT still
held that Commerce’s fifteen-day policy was not in accordance with law.69

In reaching this conclusion, the CIT first recognized that interested parties have “a
statutory right to obtain meaningful judicial review” which arises out of 19 U.S.C. § 1516a.70
Section 1516a provides for interested parties in AD/CVD proceedings to invoke the jurisdiction

65 Mukand, 30 C.I.T. at 1314; Mittal, 31 C.I.T. at 1145. See also Mittal Steel Galati S.A. v. United
States, 31 C.I.T. 730 (2007) (“Mittal II”) (J. Gordon) (following the CIT’s reasoning in Mukand to
uphold Commerce’s fifteen-day policy).

66 See SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1351 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009) (“SKF I”); SKF II,
659 F. Supp. 2d at 1340; SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 675 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009)
LEXIS 58 (May 17, 2010) (“SKF IV”).

67 SKF I, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1361.

68 Id. at 1363.

69 Id.

70 Id. at 1364 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1516a).
of the CIT and for an injunction against liquidation in such cases. The CIT found that this “statutory right implies, necessarily, some reasonable opportunity in which a plaintiff may seek to obtain the specific type of injunction” described in Section 1516a. Having recognized this, the CIT concluded that Commerce’s fifteen-day policy impermissibly burdened an interested party’s right to meaningful judicial review:

Consistent with its fifteen-day policy . . ., Commerce could issue liquidation instructions the first day after publication of the final results of a review, and Customs could liquidate the entries immediately. In that event, an interested party essentially would have no reasonable opportunity to obtain an injunction against liquidation or even a {temporary restraining order (“TRO”)}. To ensure that it will have the chance to obtain an injunction, such a plaintiff would need to file a summons, complaint, and a motion or application for a TRO (if a consented-to injunction is not obtainable), and actually obtain a TRO, all on the day following publication of the final results. The fifteen-day policy, as practiced by Commerce, induces an absurd, and unnecessary, “race to the courthouse” that burdens impermissibly the right of a prospective plaintiff to seek the injunction that Congress contemplated in enacting § 1516a(c)(2) and frustrates the purpose of that provision.

The CIT also addressed the court’s decisions with respect to Commerce’s fifteen-day policy in Mukand and Mittal. With respect to Mukand, the CIT stated that the case was limited to its facts, which involved liquidation instructions that were issued 35 days after publication of the final results and actual liquidation occurring 75 days after publication. Thus, the CIT in SKF I found that “Mukand does not state a broad holding that the fifteen-day policy . . . is invariably permissible.” The CIT also stated that Mittal recognized “the possibility Commerce

71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1364-65 (internal citations omitted).
74 Id. at 1366-67.
75 Id.
76 Id.
and Customs may act so quickly as to practically foreclose interested parties from obtaining judicial review of subject entries pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a, and such a foreclosure would render Commerce’s policy unreasonable.”77 Moreover, the CIT found that Mittal “did not address explicitly the question of whether the fifteen-day policy, by allowing liquidation to occur almost immediately upon publication of final results, comports with {the statute}.”78

Based on the fact that Commerce’s original fifteen-day policy allowed liquidation to occur almost immediately upon publication of Commerce’s final results, rather than providing “a minimally reasonable time during which a party may seek to obtain an injunction against liquidation,” the CIT ruled against the fifteen-day policy.79 It awarded the plaintiffs a declaratory judgment stating that Commerce’s application of the fifteen-day policy in the case on appeal or in any future cases was contrary to law.80

The CIT’s decision in SKF I was followed by a similar decision in SKF USA Inc. v. United States (“SKF II”) in which the CIT again held Commerce’s fifteen-day policy to be unreasonable and not in accordance with law.81 In SKF II, the CIT addressed the revised version of Commerce’s fifteen-day policy, which Commerce had announced in the underlying final results that were being challenged on appeal.82 The CIT continued to find that although the statute provides parties 30 days to file a summons and an additional 30 days to file a complaint when appealing an AD/CVD determination before the CIT, the statute does not specifically

77 Id. at 1367 (quoting Mittal, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1281) (some internal quotations and citations omitted).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 SKF II, F. Supp. 2d at 1340.
82 Id. at 1347.
require that Commerce wait thirty days or any other amount of time after publication of the
determination to issue liquidation instructions.\textsuperscript{83} However, the CIT also continued to find that
the issue of how much time interested parties are afforded to appeal an AD/CVD determination
and seek an injunction against liquidation “unquestionably is important to the functioning of the
statutory scheme under which parties may obtain meaningful judicial review of the final results
of an administrative review of an antidumping duty order.”\textsuperscript{84}

The CIT concluded that in adopting its revised fifteen-day policy, Commerce failed to
consider the factors that the governing statutory provisions make relevant to any policy on the
timing of the issuance of liquidation instructions to Customs.\textsuperscript{85} In particular, the CIT found that
Commerce failed to consider “the importance of an orderly administration of the statutory
scheme, under which affected parties may exercise freely their right to seek and obtain
meaningful judicial review, and the need for Commerce to achieve its regulatory objectives
without imposing unnecessary costs and burdens on affected parties.”\textsuperscript{86} In other words, whereas
the CIT found in \textit{SKF I} that Commerce’s original fifteen-day policy was unlawful because it
allowed liquidation to occur almost immediately upon publication rather than providing a
minimally reasonable time during which a party may seek to obtain a preliminary injunction, the
CIT found in \textit{SKF II} that Commerce’s revised fifteen-day policy was unlawful because

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Id.} at 1349. The CIT noted that in \textit{Tianjin Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States} (“\textit{Tianjin}”), the
CIT had stated that Commerce’s previous fifteen-day policy was not in accordance with law because
it contravened the sixty-day time frame for filing a summons and complaint. \textit{Id.} (citing \textit{28 CIT 1635,
However, the CIT found that this statement in \textit{Tianjin} was \textit{dicta} because it “was not effectuated in the
judgment entered in the case.” \textit{Id.} Thus, the CIT concluded that \textit{Tianjin} did not establish a precedent
that was controlling in \textit{SKF II}. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Id.} at 1350.

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Id.} at 1350-51.
Commerce had failed to consider the factors relevant to adopting any policy on the issuance of liquidation instructions.

The CIT also addressed Commerce’s revised fifteen-day policy in two subsequent decisions, *SKF USA Inc. v. United States* (“*SKF III*”) and *SKF USA Inc. v. United States* (“*SKF IV*”). In each of these decisions, the CIT relied on its reasoning in *SKF II* to hold that Commerce’s fifteen-day policy was unlawful.

### IV. Is Legislation Necessary?

As discussed below, a legislative solution may be necessary to ensure that parties’ rights to judicial review and effective relief from erroneous AD/CVD determinations are protected. Although the recent decisions issued by the CIT and the Federal Circuit are helpful in preserving and enhancing the protection of parties’ rights, the effect of those decisions may be limited in future cases based on the particular facts presented, the limited precedential effect of CIT decisions on subsequent cases arising at the CIT, and the fact that conflicting decisions already exist within the CIT’s jurisprudence. In addition, despite the recent decisions finding Commerce’s fifteen-day policy for issuing liquidation instructions to be unlawful, Commerce continues to apply it. Legislation may be the only means of preventing the premature liquidation of entries subject to a potential or actual appeal.

A legislative fix would address the problems posed by Commerce’s fifteen-day policy for issuing liquidation instructions. Commerce’s fifteen-day policy has been widely criticized and repeatedly challenged. Indeed, some of the most pointed criticism of the policy has been offered in decisions that have upheld the policy as lawful. In *Mukand*, Judge Gordon took the

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extraordinary step of offering his “unsolicited advice” that to avoid parties being deprived of their statutory right to judicial review, Commerce should “issue instructions that direct Customs to liquidate no earlier than (1) the date that is 90 days after the *Federal Register* publication date, and no later than (2) the six-month anniversary of that publication date unless liquidation is enjoined pursuant to court order.” As Judge Gordon recognized, this practice would provide “much needed certainty to the liquidation process” and “afford interested parties ample time in which to contemplate suit, and if so inclined, to commence their actions and obtain the requisite injunction against liquidation.” In the event Commerce was unwilling to change its policy, Judge Gordon suggested “some form of legislative ‘fix’ by Congressional action – perhaps via an amendment . . . that suspends liquidation pending judicial review.” Similarly, Judge Pogue stated in *Mittal* that “a longer period – for issuance of instructions and initiating liquidation by Customs – would be more indicative of Commerce’s consideration of all the factors and interests involved in the adoption of its 15 day policy.”

Notwithstanding these concerns and the four recent CIT decisions that have declared Commerce’s fifteen-day policy to be unlawful, it appears quite certain that Commerce will continue to apply the policy in future cases. In *SKF IV*, for example, the CIT noted that “despite the court’s prior holding that the fifteen-day policy was contrary to law, Commerce has continued to apply its fifteen-day policy in multiple administrative reviews in 2010” and “has given no indication that it will modify that policy or otherwise remedy the continuing harm the

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89 *Mukand*, 30 C.I.T. at 1314-15; *Mittal II*, 31 C.I.T. at 739.
90 *Mukand*, 30 C.I.T. at 1315.
91 *Id.* at 1314.
92 *Mittal*, 31 C.I.T. at 1146.
court identified in {SKF II.}”

Moreover, as recently as September 2010, Commerce made explicit in its final results for an administrative review of the AD order on Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof that it will continue to apply its fifteen-day policy. In doing so, Commerce explained simply that “{o}ur policy is based upon administrative necessity, namely that we must provide {Customs} with sufficient time to liquidate all entries . . . before the entries are deemed liquidated.”

It is also clear that the government will continue to require as conditions of its consenting to the entry of a preliminary injunction in AD/CVD appeals (1) that the party seeking a preliminary injunction personally serve it on certain Commerce and Customs officials and (2) that the injunction only take effect five days after it is served on the appropriate officials. This is evidenced by the fact that the government has continued to insist on these conditions in recent appeals of AD/CVD determinations before the CIT.

The decisions recently issued by the CIT and the Federal Circuit in Agro Dutch, Clearon, and the SKF line of cases are significant steps forward, but they do not guarantee that parties’ rights to judicial review and effective relief from erroneous AD/CVD determinations will be preserved in all cases. This is true for several reasons. First, the decisions may be limited to

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94 Issues and Decision Memorandum in Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, 75 Fed. Reg. 53661 (Dep’t Commerce Sept. 1, 2010) (final results) at Comment 8.
95 Id.
their particular facts. Moreover, the CIT decisions in *Clearon* and the *SKF* cases are not binding on other CIT judges. While the CIT will consider the holding and reasoning of a previous opinion by a different judge of the CIT for its persuasive power, such an opinion is not binding precedent.\(^97\) Indeed, there is already conflicting authority within the CIT between *Clearon* and *Ames True Temper* as to whether the personal service requirement included in preliminary injunctions for AD/CVD appeals may be disregarded so as to preserve a party’s right to judicial review and relief.\(^98\) There is also conflicting authority within the CIT regarding whether Commerce’s fifteen-day policy is in accordance with law.\(^99\)

The bottom line is that the only way to definitively protect against premature liquidations and to preserve parties’ rights to judicial review and effective relief in AD/CVD appeals is to address the issue legislatively. In this regard, the Customs and International Trade Bar Association has proposed legislation that would prohibit Commerce from issuing liquidation

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\(^97\) *Nucor v. United States*, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1380 n. 47 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008) (“Whenever this Court considers the holding and reasoning of a previous opinion rendered by a different Judge of the CIT, it regards such opinions as persuasive, of course, but not binding precedent.”); *E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States*, 23 C.I.T. 343, 348 (1999) (“{T}he precedential value of prior judicial determinations of this court is not clear in trade cases, even where the parties are the same and the operative facts do not differ in any significant way”).

\(^98\) Compare *Clearon*, Slip Op. 2010-86 at 2-3, 2010 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 89 at *2-3* (disregarding language in a preliminary injunction that required the injunction to be personally served on certain Commerce and Customs officials) with *Ames True Temper*, Slip Op. 2010-33 at 3-4, 2010 Ct. Intl. Trade Lexis at *3* (dismissing an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the respondent had failed to serve the preliminary injunction on certain Commerce and Customs officials and the entries subject to appeal had been deemed liquidated).

\(^99\) Compare *SKF I*, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1353 (holding Commerce’s fifteen-day policy to be unreasonable and not in accordance with law); *SKF II*, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 1340 (same); *SKF III*, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 1264 (same); *SKF IV*, Slip Op. 2010-57, 2010 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 58 (same) with *Mukand*, 30 C.I.T. at 1209 (upholding Commerce’s fifteen-day policy as reasonable and in accordance with law); *Mittal*, 31 C.I.T. at 1143 (same); *Mittal II*, 31 C.I.T. at 730 (same).
instructions to Customs “until the time for appeal under {19 U.S.C. § 1516a} has elapsed.”

This proposal represents one reasonable approach to the problem. A similar, and equally reasonable, approach would be to adopt Judge Gordon's suggestion of having legislation that suspends liquidation pending judicial review. 101

V. Conclusion

Ensuring that parties are not deprived of their statutory rights to judicial review and effective relief in appeals from erroneous AD/CVD determinations is of critical importance. Although the recent decisions issued by the CIT and Federal Circuit are certainly helpful in this regard, they do not by any means solve the problem. Rather, the only true solution may be a legislative one.


101 See Mukand, 30 C.I.T. at 1314.

* This is a draft of an article that is forthcoming in 19 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. (2011). Reprinted with the permission of the Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law.